Copyright 2012 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 107, No. 1

Articles
THE BRUSSELS EFFECT
Anu Bradford
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underestimated global power that the European Union is exercising through
its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that
influence to the rest of the world. Without the need to use international
institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has a strong and
growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the
legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a
notable “Europeanization” of many important aspects of global commerce.
The Article identifies the precise conditions for and the specific mechanism
through which this externalization of EU’s standards unfolds. Enhanced
understanding of these conditions and this mechanism helps explain why
the EU is currently the only jurisdiction that can wield unilateral influence
across a number of areas of law—ranging from antitrust and privacy to
health and environmental regulation—and why the markets, other states,
and international institutions can do little to constrain Europe’s global
regulatory power.
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INTRODUCTION
It is common to hear Europe described today as the power of the past.
Europe is perceived to be weak militarily.1 Its relative economic power is
declining as Asia’s is rising. Its common currency may be on the verge of
disintegrating. On the world stage, the European Union is thought to be
waning into irrelevance due to its inability to speak with one voice.2 Given
its seemingly declining power status and inability to get its way alone, the
1

See Charles Grant, How to Make Europe’s Military Work, FT.COM (Aug. 16, 2009, 6:53 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f32e0e98-8a8b-11de-ad08-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Bwh5garO.
2
See Philip Stephens, Europe’s Leaders Recoil from Unity, FT.COM (Dec. 2, 2010, 10:44 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1301e064-fe53-11df-abac-00144feab49a.html#axzz29D0EJCei; see also
Charles Grant, The Unraveling of the EU, PROSPECT, July 2009, at 48, 48 (“Russian, Chinese[, and]
Indian policy-makers . . . view it as a trade bloc that had pretensions to power but has failed to realise
them because it is divided and badly organised.”).
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EU is perceived as needing to retreat to weak multilateralism and
international institutions.
Contrary to this prevalent perception, this Article highlights a deeply
underestimated aspect of European power that the discussion on
globalization and power politics overlooks: Europe’s unilateral power to
regulate global markets. The European Union sets the global rules across a
range of areas, such as food, chemicals, competition, and the protection of
privacy. EU regulations have a tangible impact on the everyday lives of
citizens around the world.3 Few Americans are aware that EU regulations
determine the makeup they apply in the morning,4 the cereal they eat for
breakfast,5 the software they use on their computer,6 and the privacy settings
they adjust on their Facebook page.7 And that’s just before 8:30 AM. The
EU also sets the rules governing the interoffice phone directory they use to
call a coworker.8 EU regulations dictate what kind of air conditioners
Americans use to cool their homes9 and why their children no longer find
soft plastic toys in their McDonald’s Happy Meals.10 This phenomenon—
the “Brussels Effect”—is the focus of this Article.
This Article explains how and why the rules and regulations
originating from Brussels have penetrated many aspects of economic life
within and outside of Europe through the process of “unilateral regulatory
globalization.” Unilateral regulatory globalization occurs when a single
state is able to externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders
through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of standards.
3

See, e.g., David Scheer, For Your Eyes Only—Europe’s New High-Tech Role: Playing Privacy
Cop to the World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at A1; Brandon Mitchener, Standard Bearers:
Increasingly, Rules of Global Economy Are Set in Brussels, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at A1; Editorial,
Regulatory Imperialism, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1193347205
39572002.html; see Case COMP/M.5984, Intel/McAfee, EUR-Lex 32011M5984 (Jan. 26, 2011).
4
See Council Directive 76/768/EEC, of 27 July 1976 on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Cosmetic Products, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 169.
5
See Regulation (EC) 1829/2003, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1.
6
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 101 &
102, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 88–89 [hereinafter TFEU].
7
See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
8
See id.
9
See Directive 2002/95/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on
the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment,
2003 O.J. (L 37) 19 [hereinafter Directive 2002/95/EC].
10
See Regulation (EC) 1907/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December
2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),
Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, 2007 O.J. (L 136) 3 [hereinafter REACH]; Directive
2005/84/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2005 Relating to
Restrictions on the Marketing and Use of Certain Dangerous Substances and Preparations (Phthalates in
Toys and Childcare Articles), 2005 O.J. (L 344) 40.
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This process can be distinguished from political globalization of regulatory
standards where regulatory convergence results from negotiated standards,
including international treaties or agreements among states or regulatory
authorities.11 It is also different from unilateral coercion, where one
jurisdiction imposes its rules on others through threats or sanctions.12
Unilateral regulatory globalization is a development where a law of one
jurisdiction migrates into another in the absence of the former actively
imposing it or the latter willingly adopting it.
Critics of globalization have claimed that trade liberalization
undermines domestic regulation.13 Extensive literature has emerged
regarding the “race to the bottom” phenomenon—the idea that countries
lower their regulatory standards in order to improve their relative
competitive position in the global economy.14 Recently, many of the
assumptions driving this influential literature have been discredited.15 For
example, fears of businesses relocating to pollution havens or capital flights
following higher levels of corporate taxation have not materialized in large
numbers. Indeed, scholars have shown that international trade has
frequently triggered a “race to the top,” whereby domestic regulations have
become more stringent as the global economy has become more
integrated.16 Still, the race to the bottom paradigm remains influential,
shaping the debates among scholars and policy makers alike.
11

See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162.
12
The United States, for example, has imposed sanctions to compel other countries to adopt stricter
rules in areas such as antiterrorism and drug enforcement. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 11 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing foreign-policy use of economic
sanctions generally).
13
See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Preface to LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE
ORGANIZATION?: CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY, at ix, xi (1999).
14
Id.; see also ALAN TONELSON, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM: WHY A WORLDWIDE WORKER
SURPLUS AND UNCONTROLLED FREE TRADE ARE SINKING AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS 14–15
(2002) (“[G]overnments and workers all over the world have been forced into a competition for
productive investment that is most often won by scrapping or forswearing most of the laws and
regulations that complicate business operations and lower short-term profits, but that also ensure that
living wages are paid, that workplaces are safe, and that pollution is controlled.”). For a general
discussion of this dynamic, see DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION:
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2004), in particular Parts I, II, and V.
15
See David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan, Introduction to DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE:
HOW GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES 4–5 (David Vogel & Robert A.
Kagan eds., 2004) [hereinafter DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE].
16
See Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, A Race to the Bottom or Governance from the Top?, in
COPING WITH GLOBALIZATION 31, 31–51 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 2000); David Vogel,
Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection, 4 J. EUR.
PUB. POL’Y 556, 563 (1997); Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 2–8; see also ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE,
FLAGGING STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND LABOR REGULATIONS
AT SEA (2006) (seeking to identify conditions under which a race to the top, race to the bottom, and a
race to the middle take place).
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The discussion on global regulatory races mirrors the debates on
regulatory outcomes in federal systems. The “Delaware Effect” has been
used to explain devolution in standards within the United States: since
corporations can be incorporated in any state irrespective of where they do
business, all states have an incentive to relax their chartering requirements
in order to attract tax revenues that corporations bring to the state. Delaware
has been the winner of this race by virtue of being the most attractive place
to incorporate, either from the perspective of management, shareholders, or
both.17 The “California Effect” captures an opposite phenomenon: due to its
large market and preference for strict consumer and environmental
regulations, California is, at times, effectively able to set the regulatory
standards for all the other states.18 Businesses willing to export to California
must meet its standards, and the prospect of scale economies from uniform
production standards gives these firms an incentive to apply this same
(strict) standard to their entire production.19
This Article explores the dynamics of the California Effect in a global
context.20 It focuses on the conditions under which a single country can
externalize its regulations on other countries. It argues that the following
conditions are necessary for a jurisdiction to dictate rules for global
commerce: the jurisdiction must have a large domestic market, significant
regulatory capacity, and the propensity to enforce strict rules over inelastic
targets (e.g., consumer markets) as opposed to elastic targets (e.g., capital).
In addition, unilateral regulatory globalization presumes that the benefits of
adopting a uniform global standard exceed the benefits of adhering to
multiple, including laxer, regulatory standards. This is the case in particular
when the firms’ conduct or production is nondivisible, meaning that it is not
legally or technically feasible, or economically viable, for the firm to
maintain different standards in different markets.
Unpacking the determinants of unilateral regulatory globalization
explains why the EU has become the predominant regulator of global
commerce, and why the EU can successfully export certain norms and not
others. The EU has the world’s largest internal market, supported by strong
regulatory institutions. Trading with the EU requires foreign companies to
adjust their conduct or production to EU standards—which often represent
the most stringent standards—or else forgo the EU market entirely. Rarely
17

See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New
Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 761–63 (1987).
18
See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1995).
19
See Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 9. For an example of a California regulation that prompted
firms to adopt the California standard and alter their production nationwide, see Safe Drinking Water
and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–.13 (West 2006) (on
labeling requirements in the presence of carcinogenic or reproductive toxins in consumer products or
food).
20
See Vogel, supra note 16, at 562.
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is the latter an option. In addition, companies cannot undermine EU rules
by moving regulatory targets to another jurisdiction because the EU
primarily regulates inelastic consumer markets as opposed to more elastic
capital markets. While the EU regulates only its internal market,
multinational corporations often have an incentive to standardize their
production globally and adhere to a single rule. This converts the EU rule
into a global rule—the “de facto Brussels Effect.” Finally, after these
export-oriented firms have adjusted their business practices to meet the
EU’s strict standards, they often have the incentive to lobby their domestic
governments to adopt these same standards in an effort to level the playing
field against their domestic, non-export-oriented competitors—the “de jure
Brussels Effect.”21
This Article also seeks to explain what prompts the EU to exercise this
authority and what implications this regulatory leverage has on other
countries, including the United States. It concludes that the EU’s external
regulatory agenda is primarily, even if not exclusively, driven by a set of
entrenched domestic policy preferences and the EU’s efforts to create an
internal market that reflects those preferences. The EU’s external regulatory
agenda has thus emerged largely as an inadvertent by-product of that
internal goal rather than as a result of some conscious effort to engage in
“regulatory imperialism.”
After acknowledging the many manifestations and benefits of the EU’s
global regulatory authority, this Article moves on to discuss the limits of the
Brussels Effect and the extent to which other countries or international
institutions are able to counterbalance the EU’s regulatory hegemony.
Markets have a limited ability to act as a constraint on the
“Europeanization” of global economic activity given that the EU primarily
regulates policy areas of low elasticity, including consumer markets. Other
states are also often powerless. Countries whose regulatory preferences are
overridden by the EU’s standards gain nothing by entering into a regulatory
race with the EU—outpacing the EU will only leave them with even higher,
and hence less desirable, regulatory standards. Further, international
institutions have only an imperfect ability to dampen the EU’s regulatory
ambitions since issues such as privacy and antitrust do not fall within the
purview of the WTO or other international institutions.22 This Article
therefore argues that the greatest check on the EU’s regulatory powers
comes from within the EU itself. As the EU’s powers grow, internal
divisions within the EU will increase. Thus, in the end, the boundaries of

21

See generally VOGEL, supra note 18 (discussing a similar phenomenon in federal systems).
See, e.g., Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); see also Anu Bradford, When
the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (discussing the WTO’s failure to
facilitate global cooperation on antitrust issues).
22
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the EU’s regulatory reach will be defined by the EU’s own evolving
conception of the limits of its regulatory authority.
This Article contributes to the scholarship on international regulatory
convergence.23 It also engages directly with the literature on the direction of
possible regulatory races, such as whether the Delaware Effect or the
California Effect is more pervasive in explaining regulatory outcomes
globally.24 While the Article builds on the existing theory of the California
Effect, it goes beyond it in two critical ways. First, it seeks to outline the
precise conditions that allow an upward regulatory convergence to take
place. While the California Effect is recognized as a phenomenon,25 existing
scholarship has not explained its actual scope beyond anecdotes and
individual examples. Second, it uncovers and explains a perhaps most
significant example of the California Effect—its global occurrence—that
has been undertheorized and underestimated as an empirical phenomenon.
The existing scholarship on the California Effect has recognized the
importance of market size and scale economies as a source of a
jurisdiction’s external regulatory clout. At the same time, it has failed to
acknowledge factors such as regulatory capacity and inelasticity as key
components of the theory, and it has overlooked criteria other than scale
economies as factors that can prevent a company from producing different
varieties for different markets. Thus, the discussion of the Brussels Effect
provides a more nuanced theory of the conditions under which a single
jurisdiction can exert regulatory influence outside its borders. Second, the
global regulatory clout that the EU exercises via the Brussels Effect has
been vastly underappreciated. Scholarship on international regulatory
convergence has focused on a country’s market size as the best proxy for its
external regulatory influence. This Article, however, shows that market
power alone does not explain international regulatory outcomes. A more
accurate and complete understanding of the conditions underlying the
Brussels Effect explains why the EU, as opposed to any other large
economy, can unilaterally supply global standards.
In addition, this Article makes the following contributions. First, it
shows that the Brussels Effect is more pervasive and widespread than thus
far recognized. The current literature on upward regulatory races focuses
almost exclusively on environmental regulation.26 Even there, scholars
23

E.g., Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different
Pathways to Policy Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 841, 841–59 (2005); Beth Simmons, The
International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, in DYNAMICS OF
REGULATORY CHANGE, supra note 15, at 42, 50–52.
24
See, e.g., Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 6, 9.
25
See VOGEL, supra note 18.
26
See, e.g., Katharina Holzinger & Thomas Sommerer, ‘Race to the Bottom’ or ‘Race to
Brussels’?: Environmental Competition in Europe, 49 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 315, 329 (2011)
(concluding that empirical evidence demonstrates a “far-reaching upward trend in environmental
regulation from the 1970s until today”).
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claim that regulatory globalization through the California Effect is
constrained to “only a highly limited subset of environmental laws”27 and
largely excluded in the case of production (as opposed to product)
standards28 or consumer protection.29 This view fails to capture the full
impact of the phenomenon.
Second, the existing literature focuses on the race to the top that takes
place when a lax foreign regulator formally adopts the strict rule of the lead
regulator.30 This attention to “de jure regulatory convergence” fails to
account for an important phenomenon that takes place in the absence of
formal changes to legal rules. In reality, this type of formal “trading up”
often fails to occur. Instead, we typically see only a “de facto regulatory
convergence” whereby much of global business is conducted under
unilateral EU rules even when other states continue to maintain their own
rules. This is true, for instance, with respect to U.S. antitrust laws, privacy
laws, and rules on food safety. Unilateral regulatory globalization does not
need to elicit a formal regulatory response from another nation—often there
is no race to the top or de jure Brussels Effect. The EU law governs whether
other countries follow suit or not. Seen in this light, the Brussels Effect is
more about one jurisdiction’s ability to override others than it is about
triggering an upward race.
It is true that at times this de facto Brussels Effect is reinforced with a
de jure Brussels Effect. This is the case when other countries’ legislators
affirmatively adopt the EU’s strict standards. But even here, the path to
regulatory convergence follows a sequence different from what we have
become accustomed to in other contexts. Corporations’ de facto adjustment
to the EU rules paves the way for legislators’ de jure implementation of
these rules rather than the other way around. Thus, the implementation
problem of the de jure Brussels Effect is solved from the outset.
Third, the theory of unilateral regulatory globalization departs from
existing scholarship on the relationship between regulatory convergence
27

Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 10.
See Fritz W. Scharpf, Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European
Welfare States, in GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 15, 28–29 (Gary Marks et al. eds., 1996);
Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 67–110 (1996) (discussing
regulatory-regime exportation in the context of environmental protection).
29
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1359, 1361 (2003) (arguing that regulatory globalization does not
take place in the area of consumer protection, where regulators are assumed to have complete autonomy
to regulate their domestic markets).
30
See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 518–19 (2000)
(discussing both race to the bottom (RTB) and race to the top (RTT), and arguing that RTT is a result of
countries adopting as “best practices” those that they consider to be in their interest); Simmons, supra
note 23 (canvassing research focusing on conditions under which other regulators have the incentive to
adjust); Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 14 (focusing on de jure trading up as the foreign country
switches its standards as a result of RTT).
28
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and regulatory power. Daniel Drezner has argued that great-power
consensus leads to regulatory convergence whereas great-power
disagreement leads to regulatory divergence and the emergence of rival
standards.31 Which rival standard trumps the other depends on the
regulatory powers’ relative ability to seek allies supporting their respective
regulatory preferences and reach a tipping point after which the rival states
need to switch standards.32 In contrast to Drezner, this Article shows that de
facto convergence can take place in the midst of a great-power
disagreement. When the conditions for the Brussels Effect exist, rival
standards between two equal powers fail to materialize. Instead, the
outcome of the regulatory race is predetermined: the more stringent
regulator prevails.
Finally, prevailing theories on regulatory globalization explain the
emergence of regulatory convergence as a result of cooperation or coercion.
The Brussels Effect differs because it falls between the two. Beth Simmons,
for instance, shows how in the case of capital adequacy requirements and
accounting standards for public offerings, countries with lenient regulatory
standards have an incentive to adopt other countries’ stricter standards in
order to attract foreign capital.33 This amounts to a market-driven race to the
top that is normatively desirable—the followers have a clear economic
incentive to adopt the desirable rules that leave everyone better off. In
contrast, unilateral regulatory globalization is rarely a process of voluntary
harmonization: foreign corporations would often prefer another rule but
find it rational to adjust nonetheless given the opportunity costs of not
doing so. Yet the EU is not coercing others to adopt its rules either. Market
forces are sufficient to create “involuntary incentives” to adjust to the rules
of the strict regulator. In other words, unilateral regulatory globalization
entails the dominant jurisdiction imposing an incentive to adjust, followed
by reluctant emulation by market participants. Seen this way, unilateral
regulatory globalization is produced through “go-it-alone power” by a
dominant regulator.34
In addition to advancing the literature on regulatory globalization, this
Article makes a contribution to the literature on state power in international
relations. While traditional tools of power have waned in importance—it is
31

See Drezner, supra note 23, at 841.
Id. at 850.
33
See Simmons, supra note 23, at 49.
34
See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (2000). Gruber contests the positive-sum models of international cooperation and explains
why states join institutions that are not Pareto-improving for them. When states that win from some
cooperative arrangement are in a position to proceed even without the support of the losing states, losing
states’ interest calculation changes and they join the new institution even though they would have
preferred that such an institution was never set up in the first place. A movement or change that is
Pareto-improving is one that makes at least one participant better off without making any participant
worse off.
32
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increasingly difficult to exert influence through raw military power or rely
on economic sanctions or conditional incentives35—regulatory power that
the EU possesses is more durable, more deployable, and less easily
undermined by others.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the conditions under
which the Brussels Effect takes place. Part II illustrates the Brussels Effect
through examples. Part III discusses the reasons that cause the EU to
externalize its regulations. Part IV explains when and why the EU pursues
political (cooperative) regulatory globalization instead of market-driven
(unilateral) regulatory globalization. Part V discusses the limits of the
Brussels Effect. The Conclusion focuses on the implications of the EU’s
global regulatory role within and beyond the EU. The purpose of this
discussion is descriptive. This Article does not discuss whether strict
regulatory standards are efficient or desirable. Instead, it provides an
account for why and how trade liberalization can lead to stringent standards,
why this follows a process of unilateral regulatory globalization, and why
today these global standards are set predominantly by the EU.
I. CONDITIONS FOR UNILATERAL REGULATORY GLOBALIZATION
This Part lays the theoretical foundation for the Brussels Effect. It
identifies the conditions for and the mechanism through which the
externalization of one state’s standards unfolds. It also explains why the EU
is currently the predominant regulatory regime that can wield unilateral
influence across a number of areas of law.
Existing literature on regulatory globalization focuses on the country’s
market size as a proxy for its ability to exercise regulatory authority over
foreign entities.36 Yet a more careful examination of unilateral regulatory
authority suggests that market power alone does not determine whether any
given country’s standards can be globalized. The state must also have the
regulatory capacity and the regulatory propensity to exercise global
regulatory authority. By “regulatory capacity,” I refer to institutional
structures that are capable of producing and enforcing regulations
effectively. By “regulatory propensity,” I refer to prevailing domestic
preferences for strict regulatory standards and the predisposition to regulate
inelastic targets. Only strict standards regulating targets that cannot move
ensure that a country’s regulations will override alternative regulatory
35

See Leslie H. Gelb, GDP Now Matters More than Force: A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Age of
Economic Power, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 35.
36
See, e.g., Drezner, supra note 23, at 847 (“[A] . . . reasonable conjecture would be to say that the
public good benefits from regulatory coordination depend upon the size of the newly opened market.”);
see also, e.g., David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 91, 96 (2007) (“If [a] jurisdiction’s market share is sufficiently large, [its] regulatory
requirements can affect an even larger area, including those under the control of other sovereign
authorities.”).
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standards and make other jurisdictions’ regulatory authority obsolete
without being punished by markets or constrained by other jurisdictions’
regulatory responses. Finally, EU standards become global standards only
when the benefits of adhering to a single global standard are greater than
the benefits of taking advantage of laxer standards in lenient jurisdictions—
in other words, when targets’ conduct or production is nondivisible.
A. Market Power
In the global economy, power is correlated with the relative size of any
given country’s internal market.37 To secure access to important markets,
producers gravitate toward adopting the standards prevailing in those
markets.38 The larger the market of the (strict) importing country relative to
the (lenient) market of the exporter country, the more likely the Brussels
Effect will occur.39 More accurately, the greater the ratio of exports to the
(strict) jurisdiction relative to sales in the (lenient) home or third-country
markets, the more likely the Brussels Effect will occur. The better the
exporter’s ability to divert trade to third markets or increase demand on its
home market, the less dependent it is on access to the market of the strict
jurisdiction.
Focusing on large domestic markets alone, several states could qualify
as potential global standard-setters. The EU is the largest economy in the
world with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of nearly $16 trillion.40 It
consists of a single market with 500 million consumers.41 The EU has a
quarter of the countries’ combined Gross National Product (GNP)
worldwide and is the largest importer of goods and services.42 The EU’s
internal market is also constantly growing as new countries are joining the
EU. Of course, the United States, China, and Japan also possess domestic
markets large enough to use access to their markets as leverage. The United
States has an economy of over $15 trillion, almost the same size as the EU,
while China has an economy of $11 trillion and Japan has one of $4
trillion.43
37

See Drezner, supra note 23, at 843.
See id.
39
See Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 13 (citing Sebastiaan Princen, The California Effect in the
EC’s External Relations: A Comparison of the Leghold Trap and the Beef-Hormone Issues Between the
EC and the US & Canada (June 2–5, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/
2367/).
40
European Union, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ee.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). The GDP figure is based on purchasing power parity
(PPP).
41
See id.
42
See WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 25 (2011), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf.
43
United States, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/us.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); China, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
38
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When assessing the value of market access, foreign corporations also
consider the adjustment costs that are necessary to enter the market. A
foreign producer will have an incentive to comply with the importing
jurisdiction’s strict standard when the benefits of market access outweigh
the adjustment costs. The larger the strict importing market and the lower
the adjustment costs relative to the benefits of market access, the more
likely that adjustment will take place.44 In the case of consumer goods, the
benefits of market access are determined by the number and affluence of
potential consumers of that product as well as by the opportunity costs of
forgoing those consumers. These opportunity costs are particularly high
when demand in the corporation’s home market or in alternative third
markets is limited. The adjustment costs can consist of initial setup costs
and recurring compliance costs. They vary with the significance of crossborder differentials that determine the degree of adjustment and various
other compliance costs associated with market access, including licenses or
approval processes.
With the world’s largest consumer market consisting of a high
proportion of affluent consumers, a significant number of producers are
dependent on their ability to supply the EU market.45 They may be able to
divert part of their exports elsewhere, but few are in a position to abandon
the EU market altogether and recoup the forgone revenue in other markets.
The distinctly high value of market access to the EU explains why many
producers are prepared to incur even significant adjustment costs to retain
their ability to trade with the EU.
B. Regulatory Capacity
Large market size alone does not explain a state’s ability to project its
regulatory preferences on others. Being a regulatory power is a conscious
choice pursued by a state rather than something that is inherent in its market
size. Not all states with large markets become sources of global standards.
The state must also have the regulatory capacity to translate its market
power into tangible regulatory influence.46 Without regulatory expertise and
resources to enforce its rules, a country cannot effectively exert authority
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); Japan, CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (last visited Nov.
5, 2012). The GDP figures are PPP-based.
44
See Alasdair R. Young, Political Transfer and “Trading Up”? Transatlantic Trade in
Genetically Modified Food and U.S. Politics, 55 WORLD POL. 457, 459 (2003).
45
The EU’s population exceeds 500 million, and its GDP per capita is approximately $34,000.
European Union, supra note 40. The United States is relatively more affluent (GDP per capita of
$48,100), but its consumer market is smaller (population of 313 million). United States, supra note 43.
China, on the other hand, has a larger consumer market (population of 1.3 billion), but is relatively less
affluent (GDP per capita of $8,400). China, supra note 43.
46
See David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, The European Regulatory State and Global Public
Policy: Micro-Institutions, Macro-Influence, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 827, 831 (2007).
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over market participants—within or outside of its jurisdiction. An important
element of regulatory capacity is the authority to impose sanctions in case
of noncompliance. Only jurisdictions with the capacity to impose
significant costs on others by excluding noncomplying firms from their
markets can force regulatory adjustment.47
The degree to which a country has regulatory capacity sets important
limits on a country’s ability to exert global regulatory authority. For
instance, many Asian economies are growing at a staggering rate, but it will
take time before their GDP growth translates into regulatory experience and
institutional capacity to enforce their norms.48 Thus, acknowledging that
sophisticated regulatory institutions are required to activate the power of
sizable domestic markets, few jurisdictions outside the United States or the
EU have the capacity to be regulators with global reach.49
The U.S. administrative agencies’ capacity to promulgate and enforce
rules in the United States is well understood. The rise of the regulatory state
in the EU is more recent, yet the institutional developments that
accompanied the creation of the single market have bestowed the EU with
substantial regulatory capacity.50 The Council of the European Union
(representing the executive branches of the member states), together with
the European Parliament (representing the EU citizens), exercises
legislative authority in the EU. The Council makes decisions by a simple or
qualified majority vote or, depending on the subject matter, unanimously.
The European Commission (representing the common EU interest) is the
EU’s executive arm. The Commission enjoys substantial independent
decisionmaking authority. It proposes legislation and ensures that the
regulations and directives adopted by the Council and the Parliament are
implemented in the member states. If an individual member state fails to

47

See id. at 832.
See Colin Kirkpatrick & David Parker, Infrastructure Regulation: Models for Developing Asia
40–41 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst. Discussion Paper No. 6, 2004), available at http://www.adbi.org/files/
2004.05.06.dp006.infrastructure.asia.pdf (describing the difficulties developing countries face in
implementing an effective regulatory regime, including an economy’s “institutional endowment”). For
instance, China adopted a domestic antitrust law in 2008, vesting the authority to enforce the law among
three different agencies. See Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law,
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 145 (2008). Prior to 2008, China had no capacity to exercise regulatory power
in antitrust matters. Still, even after enacting the law and creating an institutional structure to enforce the
law, it will be a while before the regulatory clout of the new agencies will match that of the United
States (which has been enforcing antitrust laws since 1890) and the EU (which has been enforcing
antitrust laws since 1957). Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome)
arts. 85, 86, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
49
See Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power,
13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 906, 907–08 (2006).
50
See Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, W. EUR. POL., July 1994,
at 77, 83–101.
48
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implement certain regulations, the Commission has the authority to
challenge the noncomplying member state before the European courts.51
Vesting the EU institutions with the expertise, powers, and resources to
guard the common market and to guarantee the rights and responsibilities
embedded in European treaties has been integral to the entire European
project. The EU’s regulatory capacity has also gradually expanded over the
years as a larger set of regulations have become subject to qualified
majority voting as opposed to unanimity and as the European Parliament—
known for its pro-regulation stance—has gained influence in the EU’s
legislative process.52 The EU institutions have acquired these increased
powers as a result of the need to further integrate the common market and
pursue joint gains from deeper integration.
The EU’s regulatory capacity varies across different policy areas. It is
most extensive in areas like trade and competition policy, which are central
to establishing and strengthening the single market. It is most limited in
sensitive areas such as common foreign and security policy, where the
individual member states have retained substantial authority. Naturally, the
EU’s global regulatory power is limited to policy areas in which the
member states have ceded either exclusive or shared regulatory competence
to the EU.53
C. Preference for Strict Rules
Regulatory capacity must further be supplemented with the political
will to deploy it. Thus, the jurisdiction must also have the propensity to
promulgate strict regulatory standards. The domestic preference for strict
regulation is more likely to be found in countries with high levels of
income.54 Wealthier countries can better afford pursuing consumer
protection at the expense of the profitability of their firms. This, together
with the lack of regulatory capacity, explains why emerging markets are

51

See MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 39–70 (6th ed.
2010) (providing an overview of the various institutions of the European Union); see also COUNCIL
EUR. UNION, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepage.aspx?lang=en (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); EUR.
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
52
See, e.g., Single European Act art. 6, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 (granting the European
Parliament a cooperative role in regulating Europe’s economy and implementing qualified majority
voting); Treaty on European Union art. G, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 5–44 (same); Treaty of
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (same).
53
Compare TFEU arts. 3–4 (listing the exclusive and shared competences of the EU, respectively),
with id. art. 6 (describing competences that are reserved to the member states and where the EU’s role is
merely supportive).
54
J. Luis Guasch & Robert W. Hahn, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for
Developing Countries, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 137, 138 (1999).
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unlikely to exercise rulemaking power that would match their growing
market size.
But even wealthy countries differ in their predisposition to regulatory
intervention. To be a global regulator requires that the state subscribe to
strict domestic standards that prevail over more lenient standards by the
simple virtue of being the most stringent. Until the 1980s, the United States
set the global norms in consumer and environmental regulation, leading
European firms to adjust to higher standards originating from the United
States.55 Since then, the roles have been reversed as the EU has increasingly
adopted tighter standards of consumer and environmental protection while
the United States has failed to follow the EU’s lead.56 The only way for the
United States to supersede the European standards today would be to adopt
even higher standards itself—something that it does not consider to be
welfare enhancing and thus in its interest.
EU policymakers’ preference for stringent regulation reflects their
aversion to risk and commitment to a social market economy.57 European
consumers rank environment and food safety higher than crime and
terrorism when asked to evaluate various risks, leading to distinctly high
levels of consumer and environmental protection.58 European political elites
have also been ideologically less divided than their U.S. counterparts, and
consequently are more responsive to the demands of the general public for
new and more stringent regulations.59 Further, the EU follows the
precautionary principle, which dictates that precautionary regulatory action
is proper even in the absence of an absolute, quantifiable certainty of the
risk, as long as there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially

55

See, e.g., Ragnar E. Löfstedt & David Vogel, The Changing Character of Regulation: A
Comparison of Europe and the United States, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 399, 400–01 (2001).
56
See Zaki Laïdi, The Unintended Consequences of European Power 8 (Les Cahiers Européens de
Sciences Po. No. 5, 2007), available at http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/erpa/docs/wp_2007_5.pdf (“Up to
[the late 1980s], it was the United States that set the norms since theirs were the strictest. Since then the
roles have been reversed.”); R. Daniel Keleman & David Vogel, Trading Places: The US and the EU in
International Environmental Politics 1–2 & tbl.1 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/kelemen%20vogel%20trading%20places%20sept%2007.pdf
(describing how the EU’s and United States’ respective regulatory preferences have switched over time).
57
The EU’s commitment to the social market economy is explicitly mentioned as a common
objective for Europe, added by Article 1 of the new Lisbon Treaty. Treaty of Lisbon art. 1(4) (“[The
Union] shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, . . . and a high level of protection and
improvement of the quality of the environment.”).
58
See Laïdi, supra note 56, at 8; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 217:
THE ATTITUDES OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS TOWARDS ENVIRONMENT 31–32 (2005), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_217_en.pdf (noting that close to 90% of Europeans believe
environmental policies are just as important as social or economic ones).
59
DAVID VOGEL, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 31–32 (2012).
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dangerous effects may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection.60
In contrast, the risk must first be quantified and found to be unreasonable
before regulatory intervention can be justified in the United States.61 The
U.S. regulatory agencies are also guided by cost–benefit analysis, which
forces them to substantiate that the benefits of intervention outweigh its
costs.62 To generalize, the United States is therefore more sensitive to the
costs of regulatory action and “false positive” regulations, whereas the EU
emphasizes the costs of inaction and the risks of “false negatives.” These
differences often lead to more extensive regulation originating from the
EU.63
The extent of regulation at the EU level also reflects the efforts by
export-oriented EU firms to seek consistent and predictable regulatory
frameworks. Uniform regulations have abolished obstacles for doing
business within the common market—it is more complicated and costly to
comply with multiple, sometimes conflicting regulations than with a
harmonized regulatory scheme. And once all European firms have incurred
the adjustment costs of conforming to common European standards, they
have preferred that those standards are institutionalized globally. Hence, to
level the playing field and ensure the competitiveness of European firms,
EU corporations have sought to export these standards to third countries.
D. Predisposition to Regulate Inelastic Targets
Strict domestic regulations can operate as global standards only if such
strict regulations cannot be circumvented by moving the regulatory targets
to another jurisdiction. In other words, a state’s ability to override another
state’s preference for lenient standards is compromised if the target can
escape the strict regulation by simply relocating. This is the dynamic that
triggers races to the bottom as producers seek less constraining regulatory
environments. The EU avoids this circumvention of its standards by
60

See, e.g., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1
final (Feb. 2, 2000); see also Sarah Harrell, Beyond “REACH”?: An Analysis of the European Union’s
Chemical Regulation Program Under World Trade Organization Agreements, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 471,
481–89 (2007) (contrasting the United States’ “strict risk-assessment approach” with Europe’s
“precautionary principle”). However, purely hypothetical risk is not sufficient grounds for regulatory
intervention. See Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3318, para. 142.
61
See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S.
607, 642–46 (1980); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2011) (laying out general
principles for regulation in the United States, including reliance on the “least burdensome tools for
achieving regulatory ends”).
62
See 3 C.F.R. 215.
63
However, there are examples of regulatory areas where the United States prefers a stricter rule.
For instance, the United States is more concerned than the EU is about the adverse effects of smoking.
See, e.g., Paulette Kurzer, European Citizens Against Globalization: Public Health and Risk Perceptions
5–12 (April 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.lehigh.edu/~incntr/publications/
documents/kurzer.pdf; see also infra text accompanying notes 292–94 (discussing U.S. financial
regulation).
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primarily regulating consumer markets, such as product or food safety.
Unlike a regulatory target such as capital, which is more mobile, consumers
rarely move to another jurisdiction in response to strict regulatory
standards. Thus, as long as a firm willing to trade within the EU wants
access to its 500 million consumers, it needs to comply with the EU’s
consumer protection regulations. These consumers cannot be moved to a
jurisdiction where lesser protections govern what products can be sold to
them.
The inelasticity of consumer markets can be contrasted with a global
corporation’s strategic decision on where to incorporate or enlist, or to a
shipping company’s decision regarding the flag under which its ship sails.
While not perfectly elastic, capital is significantly more mobile than
consumer markets.64 If the EU, for instance, tried to harmonize corporate
tax levels at excessively high levels, a number of corporations could flee its
jurisdiction and incorporate elsewhere. Similarly, if the EU were to impose
a tax on financial transactions, trading activity could be diverted to financial
centers outside the EU.65 Thus, the EU’s choice of focusing on consumer
markets in its regulatory endeavors thus far has further reinforced its role as
a global standard-setter whose regulations cannot be undermined by market
forces and the elasticity of its targets.
E. Nondivisibility of Standards
The above conditions only ensure that the strict jurisdiction is able to
regulate extraterritorially. Meeting these conditions does not, by itself,
mean that the strict standard will actually be globalized. The Brussels Effect
is only triggered when the exporter, after having converted its products or
business practices to comply with the strict standards, decides to apply this
new standard to its products or conduct worldwide. In other words, global
standards emerge only when corporations voluntarily opt to comply with a
single standard determined by the most stringent regulator, making other
regulators obsolete in the process.
The exporter has an incentive to adopt a global standard whenever its
production or conduct is nondivisible across different markets or when the
benefits of a uniform standard due to scale economies exceed the costs of
forgoing lower production costs in less regulated markets. Complying with
64

International capital mobility is contingent on numerous factors and assumes limited exchange
controls and the ability of foreign corporations and individuals to engage in foreign direct investment
(FDI) and invest in foreign stock markets. See also infra note 294 (discussing whether stock exchange
listings are indeed elastic).
65
In the wake of the financial crises in the Eurozone, the Commission has proposed to impose a
financial transaction tax. However, the U.K., among others, is vehemently opposed. See Joshua Chaffin,
Business Attacks Transaction Tax Plan, FT.COM (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/f9d2188a-e9ec-11e0-a149-00144feab49a.html#axzz1rOJUmpsd; see also infra notes 295–96
(discussing the limits of the Brussels Effect in case of elastic targets including financial transactions).
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just one regulatory standard allows a corporation to maintain a single
production process, which is less costly than tailoring its production to meet
divergent regulatory standards.66 A single standard also facilitates the
preservation of a uniform global brand.67 Thus, unilateral regulatory
globalization follows from the nondivisibility of a corporation’s production
or conduct.
Nondivisibility of a corporation’s production or conduct occurs in three
primary types: legal nondivisibility, technical nondivisibility, and economic
nondivisibility. “Legal nondivisibility” can be seen in global mergers,
which cannot be consummated on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis—the
most stringent antitrust jurisdiction gets to determine the fate of the
transaction worldwide.68 The principle of “technical nondivisibility” often
applies for the regulation of privacy. For example, the EU forces companies
like Google to amend their data storage and other business practices to
conform to European privacy standards. Unable to isolate its data collection
for the EU for technical reasons, Google is forced to adjust its global
operations to the most demanding EU standard.69 “Economic
nondivisibility” is exemplified in market participants’ responses to the EU’s
health, environmental, and other product standards. An illustrative example
is European chemical regulation, which applies to all companies seeking to
enter the EU market.70 Numerous U.S. manufacturers, who would find it too
costly to develop different products for different consumer markets, choose
to conform their entire global chemical production to the EU standard.71 The
scale economies associated with a single global production process
therefore often allow the EU to effectively dictate the global product
standards.72
These examples can be contrasted with attempts to regulate, for
example, many labor standards. Labor markets are divisible as long as scale
economies do not require the producer to concentrate production into a

66

See Drezner, supra note 23, at 844–45; David Lazer, Regulatory Interdependence and
International Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 474, 476–78 (2001).
67
VOGEL, supra note 59, at 16.
68
See Anu Bradford, Antitrust Law in Global Markets, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 283, 308–11 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012).
69
See Ryan Singel, EU Tells Search Engines to Stop Creating Tracking Databases, WIRED (Apr. 8,
2008, 9:25 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/04/eu-tells-search/ (discussing how EU
privacy rules on search engines’ data retention practices extend to the United States “due to technical
difficulty of determining whether a particular user is or isn’t a citizen of an EU country”).
70
See REACH, supra note 10, arts. 5–7.
71
See infra notes 134–38.
72
See also JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET: WHY YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET
WHAT YOU WANT (2007) (discussing the distinct advantage of being a standard setter with respect to
products where the markets can only bear one standard). In such a case, a consumer with a minority taste
will receive no product. The ability to tip the market in your favor is therefore the only way to ensure
that products that you value are being produced.
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single production location. Adhering to one global minimum wage across
jurisdictions, for instance, entails few scale economies. A corporation can
maintain different standards in different jurisdictions without difficulty—
ranging from working hours and vacation policies to retirement plans and
collective labor strategies. When employing labor in Europe, foreign firms
have to follow the EU’s labor rules, which does not preclude them from
being able to take advantage of divergent (and presumably lower) standards
in their home markets.73
*

*

*

Thus, a single jurisdiction is able to supply global standards whenever
that jurisdiction has a large domestic market, sufficient regulatory
infrastructure, and a preference for regulating inelastic targets with strict
and nondivisible standards. Otherwise, its regulatory authority can become
irrelevant since other jurisdictions may supersede its standards or its chosen
regulatory targets may move to less burdensome jurisdictions or segregate
their standards across different markets.
II. EXAMPLES OF UNILATERAL REGULATORY GLOBALIZATION
The above discussion has focused on the conditions under which a
state can harness the power of markets to unilaterally globalize its
standards. The cumulative force of the conditions underlying the Brussels
Effect suggests that the EU is the predominant entity that can exercise
global regulatory authority across a wide range of regulatory areas. These
same conditions also delineate the kind of standards that the EU can
effectively externalize. This Part illustrates a few representative areas of
regulatory policy that demonstrate the EU’s ability to unilaterally set global
rules, focusing on antitrust, privacy, human health, and the environment. It
also discusses food safety as an example of an area where the EU’s attempt
to regulate global production has been partially successful.
A. Antitrust Laws
The strictest antitrust laws prevail in situations where conflict exists
among different regulators. If lenient antitrust jurisdiction A and stringent
antitrust jurisdiction B investigate the same transaction, B’s standard will
prevail. A company seeking to merge that would be rejected by State B has
two options: abandon the merger or abandon State B. If State B’s market is
relatively insignificant, the company might choose the latter. However, if
73

Note that this Article does not argue that labor standards cannot be exported to other jurisdictions
through other means. The argument is only that to the extent they are divisible, labor standards are not
amenable to the Brussels Effect. See, e.g., Brian Greenhill et al., Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights:
A Panel Study, 1986–2002, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 669, 678–80 (2009).
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State B’s market is large, abandoning it is not often a realistic option.74 At
the international level, the EU antitrust laws are, indeed, often the most
stringent.75 The EU also consists of a consumer market that is too large and
important to abandon. For this reason, the EU antitrust laws have often
become the de facto global antitrust standards, to which the more
permissive U.S. antitrust laws must yield.76
The reasons for the U.S.–EU difference in antitrust enforcement are
manifold. At the most basic level, the EU antitrust authorities remain
suspicious of the market’s ability to deliver efficient outcomes and are
therefore more inclined to intervene through a regulatory process.77 While
the EU is more fearful of the harmful effects of nonintervention (so called
“false negatives,” anti-competitive practices that the EU fails to regulate),
the U.S. authorities are often more mindful of the detrimental effects of
inefficient intervention (so called “false positives,” pro-competitive
practices that the United States erroneously restricts).78 Yet given the logic
of unilateral regulatory globalization, it is the EU approach that determines
the outcome.
One of the most famous examples of the EU’s global regulatory clout
was its decision to prohibit the $42 billion proposed acquisition of
Honeywell International by General Electric.79 When the EU blocked this
transaction involving two U.S. companies, it was irrelevant that the U.S.
antitrust authorities had previously cleared the transaction: the acquisition
was banned worldwide because it was legally impossible to let the merger
proceed in one market and prohibit it in another. In this sense, merger
decisions are legally nondivisible.80 The GE/Honeywell case is emblematic
74

See Bradford, supra note 68, at 310.
Id.
76
Id. at 309.
77
See Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Introduction: Antitrust in the U.S. and the EU—
Converging or Diverging Paths?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 11–15 (2004).
78
See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Remarks on GE–Honeywell: The U.S. Decision, Before the Antitrust Law Section, State Bar of
Georgia 16 (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.pdf (“In the
United States, we have much greater faith in markets than we do in regulators. . . . [T]he European
Union comes from a more statist tradition that places greater confidence in the utility of governmental
intervention in markets.”).
79
See Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with the
Common Market and the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/M.2220—General Electric/Honeywell, 2004
O.J. (L 48) 1. In contrast, for the position of U.S. regulatory authorities, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell
(May 2, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.pdf.
80
Note that not all antitrust decisions are characterized by nondivisibility. For instance, a company
may be able to retain different distribution systems in different markets. Thus, if the EU bans certain
vertical agreements between a manufacturer and its dealer, the manufacturer can often hold onto a
similar arrangement in another jurisdiction. See also infra note 300 (noting Microsoft’s decision to offer
an unbundled product only in the EU as an example of divisibility).
75
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of a difference in the antitrust regulatory approaches of the EU and the
United States. The U.S. authorities considered the merger to be efficient
and hence welfare enhancing. In contrast, the EU was concerned that any
efficiencies that resulted from the transaction, including a short-term
decrease in price, would later drive out competitors and result in a longterm increase in price.81
While GE/Honeywell is the most famous international antitrust
enforcement conflict, it does not stand alone.82 The EU similarly threatened
to block a merger between two U.S. companies, Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas, even though the deal was already cleared by the U.S. authorities
without conditions.83 In the end, the EU let the merger proceed subject to
extensive commitments.84 These included abandoning Boeing’s exclusive
dealing contracts with various U.S. carriers.85 Similarly, the EU often gets
to dictate the code of conduct for dominant companies worldwide. For
example, the EU has imposed record-high fines and behavioral remedies
against dominant U.S. companies, including Microsoft and Intel.86
The global nature of antitrust remedies is not unusual. The EU has
frequently extracted commitments that require parties to modify their
behavior globally or restructure assets in foreign countries.87 However, the
United States has similarly restructured deals where parties’ productive
assets are located offshore. Both the U.S. and EU agencies are vested with
81

See Bradford, supra note 68, at 299; see also Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger
that Europe Stopped—A Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331, 339–40
(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (describing the concerns motivating EU antitrust
regulators in the case).
82
For instance, see the EU’s decision to block the acquisition of De Havilland by the Avions de
Transport Régional, which had been approved by the Canadian authorities. Commission Decision of 2
October 1991 Declaring the Incompatibility with the Common Market of a Concentration, Case
IV/M.053—Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42.
83
Boeing Co. et al., Joint Statement Closing Investigation of the Proposed Merger, 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,295 (July 1, 1997).
84
Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common
Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case No. IV/M.877—Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,
1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 36–38.
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See William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and
International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 838–39 (2001) (discussing commitments).
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E.g., Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009, Case COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel, 2009
O.J. (C 227) 13, 17; Commission Decision of 24 May 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792—Microsoft, 2007
O.J. (L 32) 23, 27–28; see Stephen Castle, Microsoft Gets Record Fine and a Rebuke from Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at C3; Editorial, Europe v. U.S. Business, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2008, at A16.
87
See, e.g., Commission Decision of 22 Feb. 2006, Case COMP/B-2/38.381—De Beers, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38381/38381_1065_1.pdf (requiring De
Beers to stop buying rough diamonds from a Russian company Alrosa as a commitment in an Article
102 dominance case); Case COMP/M.5984, Intel/McAfee, EUR-Lex 32011M5984 (Jan. 26, 2011)
(requiring Intel to unbundle software and security solutions worldwide as a condition for a merger);
Case COMP/M.5421, Panasonic/Sanyo, EUR-Lex 32009M5421 (Sept. 29, 2009) (imposing an
obligation to divest one of the parties’ factories in Japan as a condition for a merger).
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extraterritorial regulatory capacity.88 Both recognize their authority to apply
laws to foreign companies as long as anticompetitive “effects” are felt on
their markets. It is thus not the regulatory capacity as such but the EU’s
sustained preference to impose more frequent and more invasive remedies
that has made it the world’s de facto antitrust enforcer. In some respect,
however, the EU Commission has an even greater regulatory capacity than
its U.S. counterparts: the Commission is empowered to prohibit mergers
and impose behavioral and structural remedies without first obtaining a
court judgment.89 Administrative delegation does not reach this far in the
United States, where the agencies need federal court endorsement to enjoin
a merger.90
Critics of the EU’s antitrust activism express concern over “antitrust
multiple jeopardy” and condemn the EU’s alleged overreach. Some go as
far as to suggest that the EU’s reluctance to give deference to U.S. antitrust
agencies’ decisions in the spirit of comity should give way to mutual
recognition of antitrust decisions.91 This is very unlikely to occur. The EU is
expected to defend its right to regulate its own market whenever
competition in that market is affected. The U.S. antitrust authorities know
this, conceding “We recognize that the EU is entitled to make and interpret
its own laws.”92
B. Privacy Regulation
As with antitrust regulation, the EU often sets the tone globally in the
regulation of privacy. The EU has adopted stricter privacy regulations than
the United States.93 In the EU, privacy is widely regarded as a fundamental
right that cannot, therefore, be contracted away.94 The EU favors
88

See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v.
Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-759, paras. 73, 92, 96; see also Eleanor M. Fox, National Law, Global
Markets, and Hartford: Eyes Wide Shut, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 79–86 (2000) (describing cases of
extraterritorial assertions of antitrust jurisdiction of both the EU and the United States); Damien Geradin
et al., Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law, in COOPERATION, COMITY,
AND COMPETITION POLICY 21, 24–29 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) (describing bases of
extraterritorial prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction under EU antitrust law).
89
See Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004, On the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings
(the EC Merger Regulation), art. 8, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.
90
See Kovacic, supra note 85, at 851.
91
Editorial, supra note 86.
92
Majoras, supra note 78, at 14.
93
See Mark F. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols? EU Internet Privacy and the Post Enlightenment
Paradigm, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 2–3 (2007).
94
See id. at 21, 34. “[T]he right to privacy . . . is recognized both in Article 8 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles
of [European] Community Law.” Id. at 34 (second alteration in original) (quoting Council Directive
95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 1995 O.J. (L
281) 31, para. 10 [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive]).
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comprehensive legislation that establishes privacy principles for both the
public and private sectors, enforced by independent regulatory agencies.95
In contrast, the U.S. data privacy laws are restricted to the public sector and
some sensitive sectors, including health care and banking.96 The data
privacy issues of the private sector are largely relegated to self-enforcement
by the industry.97 Individual companies are allowed to create their own
privacy policies, and consumers are expected to contract with those
companies for the level of privacy they want.98
The EU approach to the protection of privacy rights is spreading
outside its boundaries. Since the EU’s Data Protection Directive was
passed, over thirty countries have adopted EU-type privacy laws, including
most countries participating in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD).99 The United States has been an exception,
resisting the EU’s lead in privacy protection—at least until very recently. In
February 2012, the White House published a report, Consumer Data
Privacy in a Networked World, which urges Congress to adopt a consumer
privacy “bill of rights.”100 This suggests that the United States may
eventually come to embrace the EU’s privacy rules. Still, irrespective of
whether this will happen, the EU privacy standards already affect the
business practices of many U.S. companies. For instance, Yahoo! was
prosecuted before French courts for the material that it made available on its
U.S. website because that material was accessible to French citizens.101 And
this is just one example of the many lawsuits against U.S. companies in
European courts.102
95

See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 94, arts. 3, 28.
See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(4) (2006) (defining “records” protected by the
Act as limited to certain categories, and limiting the application of the Act to government agencies); see
also Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in
the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 23–28 (2000) (describing privacy
protection in the United States, including state privacy acts). The protection of individual privacy was
further weakened in the United States in the wake of September 11 when privacy interests gave way to
concerns of public safety. See Kelly Fiveash, Euro Commissioner Tells Facebook It Has Nowhere to
Hide, REGISTER (June 21, 2011, 13:03 GMT), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/21/viviane_reding_
interview/ (interviewing Viviane Reding, EU Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and
Citizenship, on the EU–U.S. difference in approach to privacy protection).
97
See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 833. However, recent developments suggest that the U.S.
government is moving towards a more aggressive stand in its enforcement of privacy rights. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Gives Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz
Rollout (Oct. 24, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/buzz.shtm.
98
See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 833.
99
See id. at 833–34.
100
See WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 1–26 (2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
101
The Internet: Vive La Liberté!, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2000, at 75.
102
See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 96, at 43 (discussing the aftermath of American Airlines being sued
in Sweden after transferring data from Sweden to a U.S. electronic reservation system without prior
96
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The EU believes that its high privacy standards are compromised if the
protected data is made available in other jurisdictions. For this reason, the
EU bans the transfer of data from the EU to third countries that fail to
ensure “an adequate level of protection” of data privacy rights.103 What
constitutes “adequate” is defined case by case by the EU. U.S. companies
have strongly criticized the EU’s regulatory efforts, referring to
“unreasonable restraints” on their business practices and the high costs of
compliance.104 Their disapproval is only likely to grow as the EU proceeds
to enact a new, even more stringent privacy law with an extraterritorial
reach.105 The proposed new data protection regulation, expected to take
effect in 2014, further expands Internet users’ rights against service
providers.106 Particularly far-reaching is the new law’s proposed “right to be
forgotten”—the Internet user’s right to demand all data on him or her to be
permanently deleted upon request.107 The new law also envisions bolstering
the EU’s enforcement efforts with tougher penalties, including fines up to
2% of the company’s annual global revenue.108 This planned expansion of
privacy rights is expected to severely curtail the business practices of
foreign corporations and, according to its vehement critics in the United
States, “represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the
coming decade.”109
Yet many U.S. corporations have already adopted, however
reluctantly, privacy policies that satisfy the EU requirements. Numerous
U.S. corporations have also voluntarily signed onto the EU‒U.S. negotiated
“Safe Harbor Principles,” issued by the Department of Commerce after the
EU Directive entered into force.110 The Safe Harbor Agreement stipulates

customer consent); see also Cecilia Kang, Promise by Google Ends FTC’s Privacy-Breach Probe,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2010, at A15 (discussing the FTC’s decision to close its investigation against
Google’s Street View service, in sharp contrast to European regulators).
103
See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 94, arts. 25; see also Shaffer, supra note 96, at 21–
23 (discussing in more detail these same Directive provisions, and analyzing whether the United States,
as a third-party country, would assure an adequate level of protection).
104
See Shaffer, supra note 96, at 75; cf. id. at 17–20.
105
Kevin J. O’Brien, Europe Plans to Tighten Web Privacy and Apply It to U.S. Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B4.
106
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data
Protection Regulation].
107
Id. art. 17.
108
See Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data
Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses (Jan. 25,
2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/46.
109
Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012).
110
See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed.
Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). While signing on to the Safe Harbor Principles is voluntary, the signatories
are bound by them. Failure to adhere to their commitments subjects the signatories to FTC enforcement
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that U.S. firms active in the EU market comply with EU privacy rules even
when their data are processed in the United States.111 Despite being
otherwise “strong-armed” into the Agreement,112 the United States managed
to negotiate one important exception: the EU conceded to allow airlines to
transfer passenger records to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in
the interest of U.S. national security.113
The nondivisibility of data has further facilitated the globalization of
the EU’s privacy policy. While national regulations may differ from
country to country, “data flows lightly and instantly across borders.”114
Multinational corporations have adjusted their global data management
systems to reduce their compliance costs with multiple regulatory
regimes.115 Internet companies find it difficult to create different programs
for different markets and therefore tend to apply the strictest international
standards across the board. At times, it is technologically difficult or
impossible to separate data involving European and non-European
citizens.116 Other times it may be feasible but too costly to create special
websites or data-processing practices just for the EU.117 As a result, the
technical or the economic nondivisibility of the EU rules has prompted
several U.S. companies ranging from Google to General Motors to amend
their global privacy practices.118 Indeed, today many multinational
actions under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act against unfair or deceptive acts or practices. See
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS: EUROPEAN UNION 143, 166 (2010).
111
See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 833–34.
112
David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, Local Power, Global Reach: The Domestic Institutional
Roots of Internet Governance, ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV., May 2007, at 23, 29.
113
See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 834; Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July
2007, on the Signing of an Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America
on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2007 O.J. (L 204) 16.
114
Legal Confusion on Internet Privacy: The Clash of Data Civilizations, ECONOMIST, June 19,
2010, at 63.
115
See Bach & Newman, supra note 112, at 29; see also DOROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING
PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 119 (2005)
(“Indeed, there is a hint that it has already become cheaper for US multinational companies to treat all
data (including US data) with the same strict privacy standard as the data of the Europeans.”).
116
See Singel, supra note 69.
117
See Mitchener, supra note 3.
118
See, e.g., Legal Confusion on Internet Privacy, supra note 114 (discussing changes the EU
demanded in Google Buzz, the firm’s social network service); Kevin J. O’Brien, Anger in Europe over
Google and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, at B5 (discussing personal information Google
collected through Street View, and Google’s response); Scheer, supra note 3 (discussing GM, DuPont,
and Procter & Gamble’s practice of applying EU-like standards to its employee data worldwide); see
also Mark Berniker, EU: Microsoft Agrees to .NET Passport Changes, DATAMATION (Jan. 30, 2003),
http://www.datamation.com/entdev/article.php/1576901/EU-Microsoft-Agrees-to-NET-PassportChanges.htm (discussing Microsoft’s agreement with EU authorities to implement a data protection plan
regarding one of its products).
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companies have only one company-wide privacy protection policy—and it
is Europe’s.119
C. Health Protection: Regulation of Chemicals
The EU has also become the preeminent global regulator of the
chemicals industry. This reflects Europeans’ elevated concern for the
adverse effects that unsafe chemicals have on humans and on the
environment. The Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction
of Chemicals (REACH) is an EU chemicals regulation that has had a
substantial impact on a global scale.120 The chemicals industry is
multinational, and the EU is an important destination market for a vast
number of chemicals as well as goods and preparations containing
chemicals.121
REACH, which was enacted in 2007, builds on an idea of industry
responsibility. Embracing the idea of “no data, no market,” REACH places
the burden of proof on manufacturers and importers as opposed to
regulators.122 Manufacturers and importers are required to gather
information on the effects that their substances have on human health and
the environment, and to provide this information to EU authorities.123
Another important feature of REACH is that it was enacted to regulate not
only new chemicals that enter the stream of commerce but also tens of
thousands of “existing substances” that had been placed on the EU market
before they were regulated.124 According to the Commission, these
chemicals represent 99% of the total substances on the market.125 The
implementation of REACH is also guided by the “precautionary principle,”
which lowers the threshold for regulatory intervention.126
119

See Mitchener, supra note 3 (citing Microsoft’s Director of Corporate Privacy, who confirmed
that Microsoft applies one company-wide privacy standard, and that is the EU standard).
120
REACH, supra note 10.
121
See Melody M. Bomgardner, Facts & Figures of the Chemical Industry, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, July 4, 2011, at 33–67 (describing European chemical shipments of $428.5 billion
and European chemical imports worth $98.6 billion for 2010).
122
See REACH, supra note 10, art. 5; Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic
Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897, 898–99
(2009) (explaining the individual responsibility required for the industry actors to provide data in order
to participate in the market).
123
See Doaa Abdel Motaal, Reaching REACH: The Challenge for Chemicals Entering
International Trade, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 643, 645 (2009); Scott, supra note 122.
124
See Commission White Paper: Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, at 7–8, 28, COM (2001)
88 final (Feb. 27, 2001) (referring to the “burden of the past”—i.e., the past effects of the 30,000
chemicals already on the market in the EU—as a motivation for regulating existing chemicals).
125
Id. at 6.
126
See TFEU art. 191(2); cf. Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. I-2269,
para. 99 (“Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the
institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of
those risks become fully apparent.”).
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REACH represents a stark difference from its U.S. counterpart, the
Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), which continues to place the burden
of proof on regulators.127 While REACH requires companies to develop
information on the safety of their chemicals, the TSCA requires companies
to develop this information only if directed to do so by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).128 The EPA also has a high evidentiary burden
when requesting safety data, leading it to restrict or ban very few
chemicals.129 The TSCA is further weakened by its provision grandfathering
95% of existing chemicals and thus forgoing any testing with respect to the
vast majority of the chemicals on the market.130
The global spread of REACH has met with resistance at the
international level. As the regulation applies to approximately 30,000
chemicals, its impact on the $600 billion U.S. chemical industry is
profound.131 Critics claim that REACH imposes significant costs and
challenges on manufacturers and importers, particularly related to the
supply chain, sales, and procurement.132 At worst, the regulation is said to
impede innovation and the development of new substances due to fears that
they would not meet the more stringent European requirements.133
Despite this resistance, the de facto Brussels Effect has ensured that
REACH is effecting change at a global level.134 Multinational firms
including Ikea, Lego, and Mattel have declared their global production to be
PVC free.135 Dow Chemical announced all of its production to be REACHconsistent, whether they are sold in the EU or elsewhere.136 Large cosmetics
producers such as Revlon, Unilever, and L’Oreal have similarly
reformulated all their products to be REACH-compatible, while Estee
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15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006).
See Motaal, supra note 123, at 647.
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The EPA needs to provide “substantial evidence” that the chemical presents “unreasonable risk”
to health or the environment, in addition to justifying the regulatory intervention under a cost–benefit
analysis. This high standard of proof has led, for instance, to the EPA’s failure to regulate asbestos. See
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Scott, supra note 122, at
903–04 (describing the burden of persuasion the EPA must meet regarding health and safety before it
can regulate or restrict chemicals).
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See Wirth, supra note 36, at 102.
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See Mark Schapiro, New Power for ‘Old Europe,’ NATION, Dec. 27, 2004, at 11, 12; Scott,
supra note 122, at 902 (noting the size of the U.S. chemicals industry).
132
See LAWRENCE A. KOGAN, EXPORTING PRECAUTION: HOW EUROPE’S RISK-FREE REGULATORY
AGENDA THREATENS AMERICAN FREE ENTERPRISE 40–43 (2005), available at http://www.wlf.org/
upload/110405MONOKogan.pdf.
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See, e.g., Anne Pouillot et al., REACH: Impact on the US Cosmetics Industry?, 8 J. COSMETIC
DERMATOLOGY 3, 5–6 (2009).
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See Wirth, supra note 36, at 102–03; see also Scott, supra note 122, at 908–20 (describing how
REACH’s effect on U.S. businesses has prompted state-level harmonization attempts).
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VOGEL, supra note 59, at 204.
136
Id. at 169.
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Lauder uses a single safety standard for 95% of its production.137 Many
foreign chemical manufacturers that export a significant amount of
chemicals to the EU are switching to REACH standards to avoid being
excluded from the large and lucrative EU market. Since they often find it
cheaper to create a single product for all markets, they have an incentive to
produce their products in accordance with the strictest global standards,
which happens to be the EU’s REACH standard.138 Here nondivisibility is
driven by scale economies in production rather than a legal or technical
inability to produce different products or pursue different conduct in
different markets. Another reason for conforming to REACH is that many
downstream users of chemicals refuse to include substances in their
products if the EU has identified any such substance as a “substance of very
high concern.”139
In addition to this kind of de facto Brussels Effect, REACH has
triggered a more limited de jure Brussels Effect, prompting international
adoption of REACH-style laws.140 Producers outside the EU who adopt
stricter and more expensive REACH standards in order to export to the EU
have an incentive to pressure their home governments to increase their
domestic regulations to the level of REACH. Since their exports already
meet REACH standards, they could then produce similar products for both
markets at a lower cost than could domestic competitors who do not export
to the EU and, therefore, have not yet developed EU-compliant production
processes.141 Similarly, a de jure Brussels Effect would level the playing
field in the domestic market against foreign producers that are not active in
the EU market and that similarly do not, therefore, conform to the EU rules.
This type of lobbying has been reinforced by consumer health and
environmental activists who have embraced the EU regulation and used it
as a benchmark in their efforts to influence domestic debates on the issue.142
In the United States, REACH has prompted state-level regulatory
reforms and the introduction of congressional bills seeking to amend the
137

Id. at 217.
See Scott, supra note 122, at 939–40; Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer, Raising Global
Standards: Hazardous Substances and E-Waste Management in the European Union, ENVIRONMENT,
Dec. 2006, at 7, 14. This is consistent with VOGEL, supra note 18, at 5–8.
139
See KERSTIN HEITMANN & ANTONIA REIHLEN, TECHNO-ECONOMIC SUPPORT ON REACH: CASE
STUDY ON “ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT” IN THE MARKET RELATED TO THE CANDIDATE LIST OF
SUBSTANCES SUBJECT TO AUTHORISATION 5, 9 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
chemicals/reach/background/docs/report_announcement_effect.pdf; see also Michael Kirschner, Why
Electronics Companies Need to Worry About REACH, EE TIMES (Sept. 18, 2007, 2:40 PM), http://
www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4181306/Why-electronics-companies-need-to-worry-aboutREACH (discussing the implications of REACH in the entire supply network).
140
REACH-type regulations have been adopted in countries such as Canada, Australia, China,
South Korea, Japan, and Russia. See VOGEL, supra note 59, at 170.
141
See Yoshiko Naiki, Assessing Policy Reach: Japan’s Chemical Policy Reform in Response to the
EU’s REACH Regulation, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 171, 178 (2010).
142
Scott, supra note 122, at 920–28.
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TSCA.143 These legislative efforts acknowledge the global nature of the
chemical industry and the existing need for U.S. companies to comply with
REACH, including collecting the safety information relevant for their
production.144 In California, for instance, the existing informational burden
imposed by REACH was seen as a compelling reason to utilize the same
data in California as well. As a result, the California Department of Toxic
Substances Control is now required to use “to the maximum extent
feasible” the safety information generated in other nations in its regulation
of chemical products, including, most importantly, the EU.145
D. Environmental Protection
While REACH is often considered a health measure, its provisions are
also directly geared at protecting the environment. Yet REACH does not
stand alone among the environmental measures spread through the Brussels
Effect. Before REACH was adopted, the EU already regulated the
management of hazardous substances and electronic waste.146 The 2003
Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS Directive) bans the
release of hazardous substances into the environment when many common
products such as household appliances and computers reach the end of their
useful life.147 The Commission has recently extended the Directive to cover
all electrical and electronic products.148
The RoHS Directive has been exported to other jurisdictions through
both a de facto and de jure Brussels Effect. Foreign manufacturers
exporting products into the EU prefer to comply with one set of standards
and thus make their entire production RoHS-compliant.149 This has led to a
global change in the design of electronic products.150 In addition, several
143
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in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (July 20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
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See Legislation on Electrical and Electronic Equipment Enters New Phase, ENV’T FOR
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See Press Release, supra note 148 (referring to the RoHS Directive having led to “important
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Environmental Rules Propel Change in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at F4 (discussing the global
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Directive, FUJITSU, http://www.fujitsu.com/emea/services/components/thermal-printers/rohs.html (last
144

29

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

jurisdictions outside the EU have adopted RoHS-type laws, including
China, Japan, and South Korea.151 California also responded to the EU’s
strict electronic waste regulation by explicitly incorporating EU standards
into its Electronic Waste Recycling Act of 2003.152 This Act, referred to as
the “Cal RoHS,” bans the sale of electronic devices in California when
those devices are banned in the EU and, rather strikingly, also states that
amendments to the EU directive will be incorporated into California law.153
The most recent example of EU environmental unilateralism relates to
its emissions trading scheme (ETS). The ETS forms a cornerstone of the
EU’s climate change policy. As of January 1, 2012, the EU folded aviation
into this scheme.154 All airlines, including foreign ones, have to buy
emission permits for all their flights that depart from or land at European
airports. This way, airlines cannot limit their compliance to the part of the
journey that takes place in the European airspace, making the scheme
nondivisible. For instance, on a flight from San Francisco to London, only
9% of the emissions are calculated to occur in the EU airspace (29%, 37%,
and 25% of the emissions occurring over the United States, Canada, and the
high seas, respectively).155 Yet the airline must acquire emission permits for
each ton of emissions emitted across the entire flight since the point of
landing is the EU.156 A foreign airline refusing to comply is subject to a
fine157 or, even more severely, could be banned from European airports.158
United, Continental, and American Airlines, supported by the U.S. Air
Transport Association, challenged their inclusion in the scheme before U.K.
courts, alleging that the U.K.’s decision to implement the EU Directive
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155
Nancy N. Young, Vice President of Envtl. Affairs, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc., Statement
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee: The
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme: A Violation of International Law 4 (July 27, 2011),
available at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyAviation/2011-07-27Young.pdf.
156
Id. at 4–5.
157
Id.
158
See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change,
EUR-Lex 62010CJ0366 (Dec. 21, 2011).
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violates international law.159 The U.K. Court referred the question to the
European Court of Justice. The European Court confirmed the validity of
the ETS Directive with various international agreements and customary
international law, concluding that the “application of the emissions trading
scheme to aircraft operators infringes neither the principle of territoriality
nor the sovereignty of third States.”160 The Court emphasized that an aircraft
flying over the high seas is not subject to the ETS. Only when the aircraft is
physically in the member state of the EU—i.e., lands in or departs from an
airport situated in the EU—does the EU attach jurisdiction on the operator
of that aircraft.161
Airlines are exempted from the ETS with respect to their flights
landing in the EU, but not with respect to their flights taking off from the
EU, if they are subject to “equivalent measures” in their home
jurisdiction.162 Whether domestic climate regulation in the United States or
China, for instance, would qualify as an equivalent provision is subject to
the EU’s unilateral decision.163 China, for instance, has already proposed
domestic emissions-cutting measures and asked the EU to consider those as
“equivalent” to what the EU requires.164 It is plausible that the EU’s
unilateralism will prompt countries to either adopt tougher domestic climate
change regulations or consider adopting international measures. And even if
no such de jure Brussels Effect takes place, compliance costs with EU rules
will likely lead to increasing demands to design planes with fuel efficiency
improvements. It is also doubtful that the airlines would limit these
improvements to planes that fly to Europe but would more likely order
entire fleets of planes that allow them to meet the stricter EU standards
more cost-effectively, confirming the de facto Brussels Effect.

159

See ATA Challenges Application of the EU ETS to U.S. Airlines, AIRLINES FOR AM., http://www.
airlines.org/Pages/ATA-challenges-the-application-of-the-EU-ETS-to-U.S.-Airlines.aspx (last visited
Nov. 6, 2012). According to the plaintiffs, the ETS Directive violates a number of international
agreements, including the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Air Transport
Agreement between the United States and the EU and its member states (Open Skies Agreement).
160
Press Release No. 139/11, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Directive Including
Aviation Activities in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme is Valid 2 (Dec. 21, 2011), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-12/cp110139en.pdf (discussing Case C366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am.).
161
See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., paras. 122–127.
162
See Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 154, para. 17; see also Joanne Scott & Lavanya
Rajamani, EU Climate Change Unilateralism, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 469, 482–83 (2012) (discussing the
equivalency concept in more detail).
163
See Scott & Rajamani, supra note 162, at 475.
164
See Saqib Rahim, U.S.-E.U. Showdown over Airline Emissions Begins Today, N.Y. TIMES (July
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/07/05/05climatewire-us-eu-showdown-over-airlineemissions-begins-88684.html.
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E. Food Safety
The EU’s attempt to regulate Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMOs) is an example where the EU has been partially successful in
externalizing its food safety regulations but where the Brussels Effect has
been incomplete. It therefore offers a particularly interesting case to
examine the relative importance of the various conditions that underlie the
Brussels Effect.
The EU and the United States take starkly opposing views on the
regulation of biotechnology. The United States regards GMO products as
substantially similar to products made using traditional production methods.
GMO products can therefore be cultivated and marketed in the United
States without extensive premarket safety studies or the need to specifically
label them.165 In contrast, the EU subjects GMOs to extensive regulation
based on their potential adverse health effects. The GMOs have to go
through a lengthy approval process, which entails an evaluation of the risk
the GMOs pose to human health and the environment.166 The evaluation is
also guided by the precautionary principle, which justifies regulatory
intervention in the presence of scientific uncertainty.167 The EU further
requires that most authorized foods, ingredients, and animal feeds
containing over 0.9% GMOs be labeled.168
Several reasons explain the U.S.–EU regulatory divergence.169 The
United States is the world’s leading GMO producer whereas GMOs are
hardly cultivated in the EU.170 Biotechnology is seen as a key for retaining
the U.S. competitiveness in export markets, while the EU places cultural
importance on small-scale farming and remains skeptical of mass
production technologies.171 Consequently, U.S. farmers and the entire
biotechnology industry are influential players in the U.S. political process,
whereas farmers producing non-GMO crops wield influence in the EU. At
its root, however, the divergence mirrors very different consumer
preferences with respect to food safety across the Atlantic. Survey data
165

See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,988,
22,991 (May 29, 1992).
166
Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, 2.
167
See Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 219–
24 (2003).
168
Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labelling of Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 O.J. (L 268)
24, 26–27.
169
But see Aseem Prakash & Kelly L. Kollman, Biopolitics in the EU and the U.S.: A Race to the
Bottom or Convergence to the Top?, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 617, 629–34 (2003) (discussing how U.S. and
EU regulatory approaches may be converging as state-level legislative activity and court challenges
against GMOs grow).
170
Id. at 627.
171
Id.
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show that 62% of Europeans are worried about the food safety risks posed
by GMOs and 71% of Europeans do not want GMOs in their food,172
whereas U.S. consumers have shown little interest or concern for the
issue.173
The above discussion suggests that the EU certainly has the requisite
propensity to regulate GMOs with the strictest standards. Arguably, over
time, the EU has also built the kind of institutional capacity that would
allow it to exercise this regulatory authority.174 GMOs are also characterized
as falling under inelastic consumer protection regulation, which ensures
that the EU’s regulatory clout cannot be circumvented by moving the
regulatory targets to another jurisdiction. But it is less clear that the other
conditions for the Brussels Effect are present. For U.S. farmers, the EU is
only the fifth largest export market and accounts for just 8% of U.S.
agricultural exports.175 Many producers should thus afford to forgo the EU
market and divert their trade elsewhere.176 At the same time, an increasing
number of other countries, including Australia, Brazil, China, and Japan,
are following the EU’s lead and adopting mandatory labeling schemes for
GMO products.177 This narrows the U.S. farmers’ scope for trade diversion.
At first glance, it appears that GMOs should also be divisible and thus
not amenable to the Brussels Effect. In principle, U.S. farmers could
separate their production and cultivate both GMO and non-GMO varieties
destined for domestic and export markets, respectively. Yet such division
can be difficult in practice. The GMO crops must be segregated from the
time they are planted throughout the processing and marketing chain. This
entails separating growing areas and preventing pollen drift from GMO

172

See EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROBAROMETER 55.2: EUROPEANS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 40
(2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2001/pr0612en-report.pdf (presenting data on
Europeans’ perceptions of GMOs specifically, with 71% of respondents agreeing with the statement, “I
do not want this type of food”); EUROPEAN COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 238: RISK ISSUES 53
(2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_238_en.pdf (presenting data on
Europeans’ perception of various food-related risks, with 62% concerned about GMOs).
173
See Prakash & Kollman, supra note 169, at 627 (citing an Environics poll, which reported that
while 78% of Americans support agriculture biotechnology, the comparable figure in Germany was
54%, 52% in France, 36% in Britain, and 29% in Spain).
174
See ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY: REGULATING PERSONAL DATA IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 147 (2008), in which Newman argues that regulatory capacity is the key variable
explaining global regulatory outcomes. He argues that the EU initially had fragmented institutional
capacity with respect to food safety, explaining its limited ability to export its preferences globally.
However, he reasons that the establishment of the European Food Safety Agency “could substantially
strengthen the European position.” Id.
175
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 2010, at XV-3 tbl.15-3 (2010).
176
However, trade diversion may entail the producers being able to sell their crop at a lower price in
alternative export markets.
177
See Prakash & Kollman, supra note 169, at 632; see also VOGEL, supra note 59, at 89 (noting
that “[a]s of 2002, seventeen countries had adopted mandatory GM food labeling requirements”).
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fields to non-GMO fields.178 Producers and distributors must also use
separate equipment, storage areas, and shipping containers, and establish
trait identification systems that allow for the tracking of produce from the
farm to the consumer.179 The specific processes by which U.S. farmers
gather and transport their crops for distribution often make their harvests
inseparable in practice.180 At a minimum, separation of production is costly.
This technical and economic nondivisibility of GMO production has led
some farmers to choose to forgo the risks and costs of separation, and
converge to the strictest standard by only cultivating EU-approved GMO
crops—irrespective of where these crops are sold.181
The practical nondivisibility of production is enhanced by the influence
and business practices of multinational food processors.182 They are
reluctant to make separate batches for the EU and United States and
frequently refuse to buy corn that could potentially cause them marketing
problems in the EU.183 Even if they secured an authorization for their
products, the labeling requirement makes products containing GMOs
unmarketable in practice. Thus, the possibility that a non-EU-approved
variety can be found within the bulk means that the entire crop is unfit for
sale to multinational food processors that export to the EU. By refusing to
purchase even conventional grain from farmers who also plant GMO
varieties, these food processors have steered some U.S. farmers away from
GMO products altogether.184
Finally, unlike the other fields of regulation discussed above, GMOs
are an interesting test case for the Brussels Effect because it is an area
where the United States challenged the EU’s regulatory stance before the
178

See CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21556, AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE U.S.-EU DISPUTE 5 (2010); see also Case C-442/09, Bablok v. Freistaat Bayern,
EUR-Lex 62009CJ0442, at 8 (Sept. 6, 2011) (confirming that honey containing traces of GMOs due to
accidental contamination from GMO test fields that were 500 meters away nonetheless is considered
food produced from a GMO under European food law).
179
HANRAHAN, supra note 178.
180
See Young, supra note 44, at 467–68.
181
Id. at 469; see also VOGEL, supra note 59, at 86 (noting that over 95% of the GMO corn
production in the United States today concentrates on the varieties approved in the EU, notwithstanding
a greater number of GMO varieties approved in the United States, and similarly, that almost all GMO
soybean production in the United States employs the single variety approved by the EU).
182
For instance, firms like Unilever and Nestle have pledged not to use GMOs in any of their
products, irrespective of the end market. Gerber and Heinz similarly exclude GMOs from all of their
baby food, including baby food sold on the U.S. market. See VOGEL, supra note 59, at 86.
183
Mitchener, supra note 3.
184
See id.; see also Wirth, supra note 36, at 104 (referring to the “virtual collapse of the market for
U.S. exports of corn” following the EU’s labeling requirements, and noting that U.S. rice and wheat
farmers have steered away from GMO varieties for the same reason). Similarly, multinational restaurant
retailers operating in the EU, including McDonalds, have requested their contract farmers to produce
only non-GMO crops to mitigate consumer backlash in the EU. See Prakash & Kollman, supra note 169,
at 632.
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WTO and won a trade dispute in 2006.185 Yet, for the reasons discussed
below in Part V, the negative ruling by the WTO has done little to
compromise the EU’s regulation of GMOs. The EU has failed to comply
with the ruling, and transatlantic trade involving GMOs remains
restricted.186 As a result, U.S. producers of GMO varieties continue to feel
the (limited) Brussels Effect due to their inability to altogether ignore the
EU market and their dependence on multinational companies who prefer to
cater to a single global standard and remain sensitive to potential risks and
liabilities they may face in the EU.
III. THE EU’S MOTIVATIONS
The EU’s exercise of global regulatory clout can spring from various
motivations—both external and internal. Some commentators argue that the
EU’s external policies reflect “imperialistic” objectives whereas others
emphasize the EU’s role as a benevolent hegemon.187 The charges of
regulatory imperialism appear misguided. A more compelling account
suggests that the EU is guided primarily by internal motivations stemming
from its need to preserve the single market without undermining the
competitiveness of European companies. Externalization of the single
market also serves the bureaucratic interests of the European Commission
and allows for the maximization of interest group support embracing
corporations and consumer advocates alike.
A. External Motivations
In contrast to the United States’ unilateralism in international affairs,
the EU is often portrayed as a champion of multilateral cooperation and
universal norms.188 However, the EU’s commitment to multilateralism and
universalism must be qualified. The EU is an influential global player with
the ability and the willingness to shape the international order to its liking.
It seeks to vigorously promote its interests on the global stage, both

185

Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, paras. 8.1–.33, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006).
186
See HANRAHAN, supra note 178, at 6; see also Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/311, at 6–7
(Mar. 15, 2012) (discussing the continuing concerns of the United States regarding the EU’s backlog of
approvals of biotech product applications); European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products: Current Status, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2010) (discussing the United States’
request to “retaliate” against the EU for failing to comply with the judgment).
187
See generally Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40 J.
COMMON MARKET STUD. 235, 235 (2002) (arguing that the EU is a “normative power” in world
politics). These concepts are further elaborated below. See also infra notes 188, 190–93, 196–200 and
accompanying text.
188
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971, 1975–76, 2005–06 (2004).
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unilaterally and multilaterally. In doing so, the EU acts like any great power
with the desire to ensure that international norms reflect its preferences.189
Some scholars suggest that the EU’s motivations are imperialistic—
that the EU is, in fact, seeking to exert political and economic domination
over other countries.190 The EU does have significant leverage over
countries that seek closer cooperation with, or eventually membership in,
the EU.191 But even outside of its immediate sphere of influence, critics
maintain that the EU is engaged in a novel form of imperialism. Instead of
pursuing its goals through military and political instruments, the EU has
been accused of relying on economic and bureaucratic tools of dominion
over countries that are dependent on access to its vast domestic market.192
Lawrence A. Kogan, criticizing the EU’s extensive regulatory reach in
environmental and food safety matters, put it bluntly:
[T]he EU has embarked upon an adventure in environmental cultural
imperialism. This is a global practice reminiscent of an earlier European
colonial era. And the fact that Europe is using “soft power” to enforce it will
hardly make it more palatable to people who will be unable to feed themselves
as a result.193

While critics claim that the EU is exporting its standards without the
consent of other states, the EU counters that it is not engaged in coercion—
it is simply enforcing the norms of the single market equally on domestic
and foreign players and merely asking others to play by its rules when
operating in its home market. Still, the EU’s regulatory stance is not
inconsistent with a desire to shape the global regulatory environment and

189

See Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 1, 53 (2011) (arguing that most major international powers are exceptionalist in that they
“seek to embody their values and interests in international law”).
190
See, e.g., JAN ZIELONKA, EUROPE AS EMPIRE: THE NATURE OF THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN
UNION 9–22 (2006); Jan Zielonka, Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?, 84 INT’L AFF. 471,
471, 475 n.17 (2008) [hereinafter Zielonka, Empire by Example]; see also KOGAN, supra note 132, at 98
(arguing that Europe’s goal is to establish the precautionary principle not only as a regional standard but
also “as an absolute global legal standard”).
191
See Laïdi, supra note 56, at 9–10; see also Zielonka, Empire by Example, supra note 190, at 476
(discussing how negotiations with candidate countries are highly asymmetrical and the countries are
presented with two options: adopting the entire body of EU laws and regulations as a condition for
membership, or not joining the club).
192
See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 3 (referring to the EU as “try[ing] to force the rest of the
world . . . to play by its cumbersome rules” as well as “impos[ing] its regulatory vision on other
jurisdictions by setting the toughest standards”); see also Editorial, supra note 86 (discussing EU
antitrust enforcement and calling for “Washington to wake up to Europe’s regulatory imperialism”).
193
Lawrence A. Kogan, Exporting Europe’s Protectionism, NAT’L INT., Fall 2004, at 91, 99. The
quoted passage relates to Kogan’s discussion of the EU’s GMO ban and the impact of that ban on
developing countries in particular. See also Peter F. Drucker, Trading Places, NAT’L INT., Spring 2005,
at 101 (arguing that one of the purposes of economic blocs—like the EU—is to export their regulations
for protectionist purposes).
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pursue global influence.194 In its 2007 policy paper, A Single Market for
Citizens, the European Commission envisioned the EU and its internal
market to be standard-setters at the international level:
[The EU] has spurred the development of rules and standards in areas such as
product safety, the environment, securities and corporate governance which
inspire global standard setting. It gives the EU the potential to shape global
norms and to ensure that fair rules are applied to worldwide trade and
investment. The single market of the future should be the launch pad of an
ambitious global agenda.195

In describing its global role, the EU legitimizes its strategies by
claiming that its values and policies are normatively desirable and
universally applicable.196 Seen in this light, the EU’s externalization of its
regulatory preferences reflects altruistic purposes of a benign hegemon. As
a champion of norms that serve global welfare, the EU wants to create a
194

According to polls, 70% of Europeans want Europe to assume this role. See Benita FerreroWaldner, European Comm’r for External Relations & European Neighbourhood Pol’y, Speech at
George Bush Presidential Library Foundation and Texas A&M University EU Center of Excellence:
The European Union: A Global Power? (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/530&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, TAKING EUROPE TO THE WORLD 59 (2004) (emphasizing as a
significant achievement Europe’s new and growing world influence); Alasdair R. Young & John
Peterson, The EU and the New Trade Politics, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEW TRADE POLITICS
1, 2 (John Peterson & Alasdair R. Young eds., 2007) (“[B]ecause its economy is important to other
actors, the EU seeks to wield influence by making access to its large and valuable market conditional on
domestic policy changes elsewhere . . . .”).
195
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Single Market for Citizens, at 7,
COM (2007) 60 final (Feb. 21, 2007); see also Reducing Emissions from the Aviation Sector, EUR.
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 13,
2012) (noting that the EU Emissions Trading System is “a step towards global action to mitigate the
climate impacts of aviation”).
196
See TFEU art. 3(5) (“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote
its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace,
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the
child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for
the principles of the United Nations Charter.”); see also Ian Manners, The Normative Ethics of the
European Union, 84 INT’L AFF. 45, 46 (2008) (arguing that the EU is indeed a normative power because
it “promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged . . . to be universally
applicable”); Jose Manuel Barroso, Europe’s Rising Global Role, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-s-rising-global-role (“[I]t is often said that the
EU’s comparative advantage lies in its normative power or the power of its values. I think this is right.
In the post-crisis world, when people are looking for new ways to ensure their well-being, peace,
prosperity, the European experience has a great deal to offer the world.”); Joseph Stiglitz, The EU’s
Global Role, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2007, 11:00 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/
mar/29/theeusglobalmission (“Europe . . . must become one of the central pillars of [the] world by
projecting what has come to be called ‘soft power’—the power and influence of ideas and example.
Indeed, Europe’s success is due in part to its promotion of a set of values that, while quintessentially
European, are at the same time global.”).
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rule-based world and offer an alternative to the more controversial and selfserving worldview advanced by the United States. A commitment to a
social welfare state and a cautious attitude towards risk guides the EU’s
global agenda and steers it towards extensive regulation of the global
economy—the protection of the environment, health care, precaution in the
field of biotechnology, and various welfare rights. By emphasizing the
universal benefits of its global regulatory agenda, the EU often succeeds in
obscuring the de facto unilateralism that drives its implementation.
The EU’s active role in the fight against climate change presents one
example of regulation that is presumably driven by largely benevolent
motives. Climate change is a global problem that requires a global response.
The EU has a limited capacity to mitigate climate change alone if other
states continue to emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The EU has
led efforts to conclude a new and more potent global climate change
treaty.197 Yet the difficulties associated with international treaty negotiations
have given the EU the imperative to act unilaterally.198 The EU’s defense of
its unilateral regulation is that it is acting in the collective interest to provide
a global public good: mitigation of climate change.199
The EU also emphasizes the strong democratic backing for its
regulatory stance. The European Commission has described the EU’s
commitment to further its social agenda as part of its trade policy as
“forging collective preferences”—cultivating the idea that the EU is indeed
concerned about the social effects of economic integration and justifying its
measures against foreign entrants as legitimate policies reflecting social
choices made collectively by Europeans.200
The EU’s own experience in creating a common market reinforces the
EU’s pursuit of a global order based on predictable rules. In forming the
EU, the member states retained their sovereignty. The only way to bind
them to the common European enterprise was to have them adhere to
common rules designed to create an internal market.201 More regulation
197

See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, The Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations: EU
Position and State of Play 1 (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO09-493_en.htm?locale=en.
198
See id.
199
See Clean-Air Turbulence, ECONOMIST, July 9–15, 2011, at 16; Editorial, supra note 3.
200
Meunier & Nicolaïdis, supra note 49, at 921–22 (quoting Pascal Lemy, EU Trade Comm’r,
Speech Before the Conference on “Collective Preferences and Global Governance: What Future for the
Multilateral Trading System”: The Emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade:
Implications for Regulating Globalisation (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/400&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en); see also Jürgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, in THE SHAPE OF THE
NEW EUROPE 25 (Ralf Rogowski & Charles Turner eds., 2006) (arguing that social regulation is part of
the European tradition). This is often referred to as an “embedded liberalism” compromise. See John
Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 392–99 (1982).
201
See Laïdi, supra note 56, at 4.
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meant more predictability and stability. This has fostered a belief that an
extensive regulatory system is needed to preserve global public goods. The
EU takes the view that trade liberalization without simultaneous
harmonization of policies fails. This, for the EU, offers the most efficient
and universally valid model of economic and political integration.202
Yet even if the EU were able to portray itself as a benevolent,
normative power that is advancing universal norms,203 skeptics point out
that the notion of a normative power has neo-colonial undertones as the EU
is exporting its “standards of civilization.”204 In the end, any entity that is
willing to shape the international order—whether for self-serving or more
altruistic motives—must do so with the means available to it. In the case of
the EU, regulatory power is all it has. Lacking traditional means of power,
the EU’s greatest global influence is accomplished through the norms that it
has the competence to promulgate. In the absence of military power or
unconstrained economic power, the EU can exercise genuine unilateral
power only by fixing the standards of behavior for the rest of the world.205
B. Internal Motivations
For those skeptical of the EU’s benevolent motives, the EU is simply
seeking to level the playing field by exporting its costly regulations abroad
under the guise of concern for consumer and environmental health and
safety.206 According to the Czech president Václav Klaus, “[t]he claims for
quasi-universal social rights are disguised attempts to protect high-cost
producers in highly regulated countries, with unsustainable welfare
standards, against cheaper labor in less productive countries.”207
A concern for EU corporations’ competitiveness offers a compelling
explanation for the EU’s global regulatory agenda.208 Europe is committed
202

See Zielonka, Empire by Example, supra note 190, at 475.
See, e.g., MARK LEONARD, WHY EUROPE WILL RUN THE 21ST CENTURY (2005); Manners,
supra note 187, at 235–58; Karen E. Smith, Still ‘Civilian Power EU?’ 13–14 (European Foreign Policy
Unit, Working Paper No. 2005/1, 2005) (discussing whether EU projections of soft power constitute
global “good international citizenship”).
204
E.g., Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse, ‘This is my EUtopia . . .’: Narrative as Power, 40 J.
COMMON MARKET STUD. 767, 789 (2002); see also Thomas Diez, Europe’s Others and the Return of
Geopolitics, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 319, 325, 330–35 (2004) (arguing that European
integration—and norm exportation—is an essential part of the process of constructing a new European
identity in opposition both to foreign nations like the United States and its own past).
205
See Laïdi supra note 56, at 5 (“For Europe knows that it is only by norms and not by force that it
can make its voice heard.”).
206
See KOGAN, supra note 132, at 3–4, 101–02.
207
VÁCLAV KLAUS, RENAISSANCE: THE REBIRTH OF LIBERTY IN THE HEART OF EUROPE 16 (1997).
208
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee: A Strategic Vision for European Standards: Moving
Forward to Enhance and Accelerate the Sustainable Growth of the European Economy by 2020, at 2–3,
COM (2011) 311 final (June 1, 2011) (“It is especially vital that in areas where Europe is the driving
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to the welfare state and the sustainability of its economic policies. Yet the
failure to export its standards to others would put European firms at a
competitive disadvantage.209 By acting as a global regulator, the EU can
defend its social preferences without compromising the competitiveness of
its industries. The worry about EU airlines’ competitiveness was explicitly
included as a rationale to include foreign airlines into the EU’s emissions
trading scheme.210 If foreign companies adhere to EU norms on the
European market, the import-competing industries are assured a level
playing field. If the EU’s norms further spread to third countries, the EU
can ensure that its export-oriented firms are not disadvantaged in those
markets. This account of the EU’s motivations is particularly persuasive
when one focuses on the private interests as drivers of the EU’s regulatory
policies and assumes that regulators are responsive to these interests.
In fact, the Brussels Effect can be seen as a way to level the playing
field at two levels. First, a group of individual EU member states advocates
EU-level legislation to ensure that their higher domestic standard does not
prevent them from competing with corporations subject to lower standards
in other EU member states. For instance, Germany, the Netherlands, and the
Nordic countries were the pioneers of the EU’s environmental regulation.211
Similarly, regulators in France and Germany were some of the key member
states who exported their privacy regulation upward within the EU.212 These
countries leveraged their regulations at the EU level by calling for
harmonized, community-wide standards. Thus, the regulatory preferences
of a small number of EU member states first become entrenched in EU
legislation, after which the Brussels Effect can transmit them to third
countries.
The push for externalization of EU standards is also reinforced by a
peculiar constellation of domestic politics, whereby environmentalists or
consumer advocates and corporations join forces in lobbying for the
globalization of EU standards. While often in disagreement, both
environmentalists and corporate interests benefit from the EU imposing its
standards on foreign firms. Environmentalists gain broader adherence to
norms that they support—many of which have an inherently global
creation of the European standard be carried out rapidly with the aim of asserting it as an international
standard. This would maximise first mover advantage and increase the competitiveness of European
industry.”).
209
See, e.g., Emma Tucker, Plastic Toy Quandary that EU Cannot Duck, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998,
at 3 (discussing the Commission’s attempt to reconcile its two central functions—demands for consumer
protection and competitiveness of European industry).
210
See, e.g., Rahim, supra note 164 (quoting the Commission’s spokesman, Isaac Valero-Ladron,
defending the EU’s inclusion of foreign airlines in the EU’s ETS scheme: “We can’t impose a burden
only to European airlines and not include others . . . . It would be distortion of competition.”).
211
See Selin & VanDeever, supra note 138, at 10–11 (discussing this phenomenon inside the EU in
connection with environmental regulation).
212
NEWMAN, supra note 174, at 11.
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character. At the same time, EU corporations gain a level playing field
whereby foreign firms do not gain a competitive advantage at their
expense.213 One example of such an alliance was a coalition between EU
corporations and environmental groups regarding the EU’s EcoManagement and Auditing Scheme (EMAS), which regulates public
disclosure of corporations’ environmental improvement record.214 Already
subject to the disclosure obligations, the EU corporations teamed up with
environmental NGOs to lobby for the adoption of the same standards by
U.S. and Asian corporations. In the end, the campaign was successful and
the European standards were converted into global standards by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).215 Thus, the EU has a
particularly powerful incentive to act externally when the moral and
economic imperatives of the community coincide—when it enjoys political
rents from EU industry and the consumer and environmental advocates at
the same time.216
It seems evident that the EU is concerned about its corporations’
competitiveness and eager to respond to strong domestic pressures calling
for the globalization of its standards. Yet the EU’s external influence can
also be viewed as an accidental byproduct of its internal motivations. The
supranational regulatory apparatus was created to establish and oversee an
integrated, liberalized, and competitive market in Europe. This institutional
capacity was a response to internal challenges driven by a political agenda
that was inward-looking.217 Inconsistent domestic regulations were seen to
threaten the single market, prompting the need for harmonization. The
importance of preserving the single market has also driven various
regulations that do not directly serve the goals of economic integration. For
instance, the EU’s expanded regulatory authority in consumer and
environmental matters was created to reassure the European public that
economic integration would not be pursued at the expense of consumer and
environmental protection. Rather than aiming to provide global
environmental standards, the EU was thus concerned with the legitimacy of
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the single market program.218 Acknowledging the primacy of these internal
motivations also suggests that the EU’s external influence is not
compromised during times when it is turned inwards—the external power
flows directly from the EU’s pursuit of its internal goals.
While the primary objective of European regulatory activity has been
to create and guard the single market, this activity has had the ancillary
effect of establishing the EU as a global regulatory hegemon. This external
dimension of the single market was only fully realized when the EU’s
trading partners expressed concerns that the single market might impose
costs on third countries.219 Of course, the EU—in particular its institutions
representing the Community interest on the world stage—benefits from
such “incidental externalities” that follow from the EU’s pursuit of the
Community’s internal regulatory agenda. These actors likely welcome the
EU’s newfound external regulatory power, however unintended its origin. It
is also plausible that the EU’s internal goals are gradually giving way to a
more multifaceted set of goals—both internal and external—that the EU
pursues in setting its regulatory policy today. Still, it is the internal goals
relating to the need to harmonize regulations within the EU that provide the
most powerful explanation for the origins of, and the motivations for, the
Brussels Effect.
Finally, the EU’s external regulatory power can be as much a reflection
of the bureaucratic interests of the European Commission as it is the
economic interests of Europe as a whole. The European Commission is the
executive arm of the EU. Through extensive use of its regulatory powers,
the Commission compensates for the lack of power it otherwise has in
external affairs. The Commission’s legal competence to act on its member
states’ behalf in foreign policy or security-related matters is limited and
subject to unanimity among the member states.220 On issues relating to the
single market, the EU’s legal authority is at its broadest. For instance,
imposing economic sanctions requires a unanimous decision in the
European Council, which subjects such a decision to a veto by any of the
twenty-seven member states.221 In contrast, the Commission has been
delegated the power to take all measures necessary to create and maintain
the single market.222
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Expanding the Commission’s regulatory authority also involves low
costs. Regulations are not constrained by budgetary appropriations and are
hence not dependent on the tax revenues available to the Community
institutions. This is significant given that the EU’s budget amounts to only
around 1% of the GDP of the EU.223 This gives the Commission limited
options to pursue policies that involve direct budgetary expenditures. The
EU does not have the funds to provide significant public goods or services
or finance a large-scale industrial or innovation policy at the Community
level. Thus, the only way for the Commission to exert influence without
extensive financial resources is to engage in regulatory activity. The cost of
complying with these regulations is primarily borne by firms and
individuals as targets of the EU regulations. And the costs involved in
implementing and enforcing regulations often fall on the governments of
the individual member states. Historically, vesting the Commission with so
much regulatory power might have been unintentional: the EU member
states wanted to restrict the powers of the Commission through tight
budgetary discipline. Yet in the absence of traditional powers of states to
tax and spend (not to mention wage a war), the Commission has built an
empire of laws and regulations.224
IV. MARKET-DRIVEN VERSUS POLITICAL HARMONIZATION
The above discussion has focused on the conditions under which the
Brussels Effect generates global standards and the factors that cause the EU
to externalize its regulations through this process. However, unilateralism is
not the exclusive path for global standards. There are different paths to
regulatory convergence, all of which operate in parallel. International
institutions and standard-setting organizations as well as transgovernmental
standard-setting bodies play a prominent role in promulgating global
standards.225 In addition, individual firms (or consortia of firms within an
industry) may become sources of global standards.226 Similarly, the Brussels
223
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Effect is not the sole manifestation of the EU’s global regulatory influence.
The EU also exports its standards through bilateral agreements—most
glaringly, though accession agreements and partnership treaties.227 At times,
EU rules diffuse more informally and lead to legislative borrowing through
various benchmarking mechanisms.228
This Part compares and contrasts two identifiable avenues for
regulatory globalization: political harmonization and market-driven
harmonization. Via political harmonization, the EU pursues regulatory
convergence through treaties and institutions. Via market-driven
harmonization, the EU relies on the unilateral Brussels Effect to spread its
norms. This Part argues that unilateral, market-driven harmonization has
distinct advantages over political harmonization for the EU. It then seeks to
explain why, despite these unambiguous advantages, the EU continues to
embrace multilateralism and pursue political harmonization in some
instances.
A. The Relative Advantages of Unilateralism
Market-driven harmonization has a distinct advantage over political
harmonization: it entails low contracting costs and limited enforcement
costs. In relying on unilateral measures, the EU is not forced to seek the
consent of other states. Unilateralism avoids the need to overcome
collective action problems or the need to extend costly transfer payments or
undertake costly coercive measures towards countries reluctant to join a
treaty or an institution. The EU can also forgo the uncertainties associated
with the ratification of treaties by foreign legislators. The EU’s recent
unsuccessful efforts to further the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations and the
UN-led process to negotiate a new global climate change treaty reveal the
difficulties associated with multilateral cooperation.229 These processes have
and Panasonic. The Blu-ray format overtook the HD-DVD format and became a global standard after a
number of market participants—including computer manufacturers, retailers, and movie studios—
switched to the Blu-ray standard. See BÜTHE & MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS, supra note 225, at
27–28.
227
See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Wider
Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,
at 5, COM (2003) 104 final (Mar. 11, 2003) (“The incentive for reform created by the prospect of
membership [is] strong—enlargement has unarguably been the Union’s most successful foreign policy
instrument.”).
228
On theories that highlight the central role of experimentalism, benchmarking, and legislative
borrowing in shaping the global regulatory environment, see, for example, Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan
Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU,
14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008). For an example of how adoption of a high regulation in the EU can help build
political pressure for regulatory reform in the United States, see Katerina Linos, Diffusion Through
Democracy, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 678, 685–86 (2011), discussing how a key argument for the passage of
maternity leave in the United States was that Europe and Japan already offered this benefit.
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Literature and commentary on the failure of these negotiations are legion. See, e.g., Damian
Carrington et al., Global Deal on Climate Change in 2010 ‘All But Impossible,’ GUARDIAN (Jan.
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required extensive political capital and diplomatic efforts and yielded few
results. Instead of engaging in burdensome diplomacy to endorse its
standards, market-driven harmonization allows the EU to outsource the
lobbying to foreign firms who often become advocates for higher standards
in their own home markets after having incurred compliance costs in the
EU.
The EU’s unilateral regulatory agenda is more easily implemented as it
requires the cooperation of foreign corporations willing to trade in its
market rather than cooperation by foreign sovereigns. A contrast can be
drawn to the efforts of the SEC and the U.S. State Department to enforce
U.S. rules on insider trading. These efforts were complicated by the
reluctance of foreign countries, particularly Switzerland, to cooperate with
the United States due to their domestic laws on bank secrecy. The United
States has had to spend extensive political capital to persuade Swiss
authorities to cooperate. This was considered worth the effort given that
Swiss banks hold approximately half of the world’s private assets.230 The
United States’ ability to curtail domestic insider trading would have been
compromised had it not secured a change in the domestic rules of a foreign
country. Merely incentivizing foreign corporations operating in the United
States to cooperate was not sufficient to meet this goal.
Political harmonization is particularly difficult if states do not agree on
the benefits of global standards. But multilateral standard-setting is difficult
even if most states agree on the desirability of uniform standards. States
often have different views on the optimal standard to which they should
converge. Different points of convergence entail different distributional
consequences, making some states prefer one standard over another.231
Unilateral regulatory globalization solves such coordination problems: the
most stringent rule becomes the focal point of convergence. A mutual
understanding that the EU can retain its standards at no cost provides a
predictable and stable equilibrium.
Perhaps most importantly, market-driven harmonization provides the
most efficient form of regulatory globalization because the EU can rely on
its existing domestic institutions to enforce its regulations. Treaties are
distinctly difficult and expensive to enforce. When a strict global standard
is a product of an international treaty, there is no guarantee that the treaty
will be implemented and enforced. The treaty on the world’s marine
fisheries is one of the many examples of negotiated global standards that
31, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/01/climate-change-deal-impossible-2010;
Megan Dee, Tackling the EU’s Emerging Irrelevance in the Doha Round, IDEAS ON EUR. (Apr.
12, 2012), http://ecfr.ideasoneurope.eu/2012/04/12/tackling-the-eus-emerging-irrelevance-in-the-doharound/.
230
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231
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48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 383, 413–22 (2007).
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fail to accomplish their goals: the treaty has not been successful in
addressing the problem of overfishing and propelling sustainable
management of fishing stocks.232 And this is not an anomaly in the world of
global standards embedded in difficult-to-enforce treaties. Indeed, some
commentators have noted that treaties producing “effectively enforced
international standards are the exception rather than the rule.”233
B. Reasons for Persisting Multilateralism
The EU has not abandoned multilateralism in favor of unilateralism in
all instances. The EU’s persisting, if selective, reliance on multilateral rules
and institutions may be surprising given the many benefits embedded in
unilateral globalization. Yet there are certain instances where market-driven
harmonization is not enough, prompting the EU to seek affirmative
adoption of regulation by foreign regulators. When above-discussed
conditions for unilateral harmonization are not present, no Brussels Effect
takes place—whether de jure or de facto. In these situations, multilateralism
is often the only path to regulatory globalization.
The theory underlying the Brussels Effect offers further predictions on
when the EU is likely to pursue political harmonization. The EU would be
expected to seek political harmonization in situations where it cares about
international standards and where the Brussels Effect fails to reach EU
corporations’ important export markets. In the absence of a level playing
field, the EU’s export-oriented firms may have difficulties penetrating these
markets. Thus, when the EU is a net exporter as opposed to a net importer
of a certain product, the EU is expected to care more about the standard of
the export market than that of its home market. Further, it is precisely then
that the Brussels Effect is least likely to automatically ratchet the standard
up, since net importer countries have a smaller presence in the EU. The EU
is therefore likely to expend diplomatic efforts to negotiate multilateral
standards in areas where it is a net exporter and rely on markets in areas
where it is a net importer.
The EU may also be motivated to encourage third countries to adopt
certain standards if its internal regulatory objectives would be compromised
by more lenient standards elsewhere. This is true when actions of other
countries produce negative externalities that adversely impact Europe, such
as when China’s failure to limit its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
directly compromises the EU’s efforts to halt climate change.234 Another
example would be the EU’s efforts to convince other countries to adopt
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tough domestic antitrust laws.235 The deterrent effect of the EU’s antitrust
laws can be compromised if members of a cartel are able to offset high EU
fines by reaping supracompetitive profits in markets that fail to control their
collusive practices.236 Foreign standards may also reinforce the desired
effect of EU standards. For example, when standards are characterized by
network effects, the benefits relative to the costs of adopting a standard
increase when several countries have the same standard.237
The EU may also seek to encourage third countries to adopt its
standards in cases where it is acting out of a moral imperative. If the EU is
motivated by a moral quest to change behavior globally—e.g., promote
human rights—unilateral globalization is rarely sufficient. This is
particularly likely when the issue is salient to influential domestic political
groups that seek to export an ideology or moral convictions and when they
care about establishing standards for universal conduct.238
Finally, at times the EU may pursue political harmonization even when
market-driven harmonization is taking place. This may reflect willingness
to “lock-in” certain EU standards by institutionalizing them.239 This can be a
shrewd way to preempt a future state of the world where market access will
be a less effective tool for the EU to exert influence. The EU is also often
successful in incorporating its standards into international organizations,
making the benefits of unilateralism over multilateralism less stark. Being a
construction of intergovernmental cooperation itself, the EU has extensive
experience in promulgating rules that lend themselves to adoption by
heterogeneous states. The EU is also skillful in using its institutional
structure—being a hybrid between state and a federation—to its advantage.
In international negotiations, it can leverage the negotiating power of
twenty-seven countries while also using the same number strategically as a
235
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constraint when portraying itself as an agent whose hands are tied and who
can therefore only sign onto a set of policies that pass the various domestic
veto points.240
Market-driven and political harmonization can also take place in
sequence. The EU is better able to institutionalize its standard if a limited
Brussels Effect has already taken place: a set of countries exporting into the
EU already follow the EU standard, whether de jure or de facto. The EU
may seek to reinforce this trend by requiring its standards to be adopted as a
condition for closer economic and political relationships with the EU,
increasing its sphere of influence within its neighborhood. These
developments allow the EU to reach a critical mass that tips the balance in
Europe’s favor in any international efforts to reach an agreement on
harmonization of certain regulations.241
V. LIMITS OF THE BRUSSELS EFFECT
The Brussels Effect is not unlimited. A number of external and internal
constraints impose boundaries on the EU’s ability to leverage its market
size and foist its regulatory preferences on other states and market
participants. This Part discusses the relative ability of markets, the EU’s
trading partners, and international institutions to constrain the
“Europeanization” of global economic activity. It concludes that these
forces and actors have a limited ability to temper the EU’s regulatory
agenda. Instead, the most powerful constraints come from within the EU
itself.
A. External Constraints
1. Markets.—Conventionally, we think that markets are able to
punish inefficiently stringent regulators. An economic theory of regulatory
competition among jurisdictions would suggest that if the EU’s regulatory
standards are too high, it would lose business and foreign investment to
jurisdictions with more attractive regulatory environments. But this
assumption is based on the premise that the targets of the regulation are
mobile. When a state regulates targets that are inelastic—as is the case in
the EU’s regulation of consumer markets—markets have a limited ability to
punish for any regulatory excesses. Consumers are likely to stay in Europe
and businesses have the choice of either providing them with goods
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conforming to EU standards or forgoing the entire market. They rarely opt
for the latter.
However, over time, the EU’s regulatory clout may begin to erode as
the emerging markets increase in the size and affluence of their consumer
base. Today, corporations are rarely able to carve out the EU as a market for
their products and services and divert trade elsewhere. But as demand in
places like China grows, businesses’ dependence on their access to the EU
market is diminishing.242 It is difficult to imagine a future state of the world
where genuinely multinational companies like GE would choose to forgo
trade in Europe and thus avoid clearing their transactions and conduct with
the EU’s antitrust authorities. But the opportunities for trading elsewhere
will increase, reducing the opportunity costs of forgoing the European
market, at least with respect to some products and activities. China will
increasingly be in a position to offer an alternative destination for various
goods if European standards make it too costly for businesses to trade there.
Still, the growing might of Chinese consumers is an imperfect threat, at
best, to the near-term ability of the EU to continue on its chosen path. It will
be a while before China could replace the EU as a source of de facto global
standards. China’s regulatory capacity and the willingness to elevate the
protection of consumers and the environment over the pursuit of growth are
not growing with the speed of its economy. While China has banned a few
high-profile global mergers,243 it has by no means overtaken the European
Commission as the most ardent guardian of competitive markets. And while
China may soon be the largest consumer market, GDP per capita is a better
prediction of a country’s regulatory propensity than is overall GDP.244
Affluence and social regulation are often correlated, suggesting that
domestic demand for high levels of regulation is likely to be weak for some
time to come.245 By the time China might be able to overtake the EU, the
EU might already have entrenched its norms in other jurisdictions and
institutions by changing the way business is conducted in a lasting way.
2. Other States.—Other states, including the United States, have an
incentive to constrain the EU. EU policies impose adjustment costs on U.S.
corporations.246 U.S. consumers also end up paying more for goods when
242
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producers are forced to accommodate concerns that U.S. consumers do not
necessarily share. The United States frequently views the EU’s regulatory
policies as inefficient and detrimental to its welfare—in addition to being
countermajoritarian and thus undemocratic. Prompted by the American
chemicals industry, the U.S. government engaged in extensive efforts to
block or substantially alter the REACH regulation.247 U.S. reaction to the
EU’s interventionist antitrust laws has been equally hostile.248 And the
recent plan to subject foreign airlines to the EU’s ETS system has been
vehemently opposed by U.S. airlines and the U.S. government, as well as
other foreign governments.249
But there is very little that the United States can do to stop the EU from
regulating its domestic market. In this sense, the Brussels Effect differs
starkly from the California Effect. California cannot promulgate regulations
that are inconsistent with the federal laws in the United States absent an
explicit waiver from the U.S. federal government. But there is nothing akin
to a doctrine of preemption that constrains the EU’s regulatory powers.250
When U.S. producers are forced to either comply with higher standards or
be shut out of the EU market, the United States has four ways to respond:
(1) choose voluntarily to converge to the EU standard; (2) try to compel the
EU to change its rules, such as by resorting to diplomacy, suing the EU in
the WTO, or offering the EU some rewards or threatening the EU with
sanctions; (3) seek a cooperative solution, such as by pursuing an
international standard that reflects some combination of U.S. and EU
preferences; or, finally, (4) choose to do nothing.251
The most controversial strategy for the United States or any other
foreign government would be to threaten the EU with sanctions. The EU’s
decision to include foreign airlines into its ETS scheme, for example, has
247
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provoked threats that foreign carriers may forgo European Airbus planes in
favor of competing U.S.-based Boeing planes.252 However, the prospect of a
trade war is often too costly for the countries themselves to pursue as a
strategy. In many instances, the proposed trade sanctions would also be
inconsistent with the countries’ obligations under the WTO. In past
U.S.‒EU antitrust enforcement conflicts, for instance, the United States
threatened the EU with trade sanctions unless the EU backed down.253 Yet
notwithstanding the escalated rhetoric of retaliation, the antitrust
controversies led the U.S. government to concede that “[w]e have no power
to change EU law.”254
A further challenge for the United States is that it often gains nothing
by defending its standard even if that standard was more efficient. As a less
stringent regulator, the United States simply becomes obsolete in the fields
where the de facto Brussels Effect takes place.255 But the United States is
unlikely to adopt the EU standard as a regular course of action, either. If we
assume that the existing domestic regulation in the United States is efficient
in the sense that it maximizes national welfare and reflects domestic
political equilibrium, any deviation from that standard entails costs. Firms
need to reorganize their production processes or practices in order to
comply with another standard.256 Governments incur costs relating to
legislating and retraining its regulators.257 And most importantly, the United
States must forgo the efficiencies that its preferred regulation would
generate. When holding onto its own domestic standards, the United States
can at least ensure that its standard governs the activity that is domestic in
nature. And given how large the U.S. market is, this often provides an
adequate incentive to stick to its preferred regulation domestically absent
overwhelming lobbying by domestic export-oriented industries to the
contrary.
The United States may also find that even in the absence of its ability
to defend its corporations from the EU’s standards, its vocal criticism of
those standards leads the EU to critically evaluate and revise some of its
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regulations. The United States’ persistent and strongly voiced criticism258 of
the banned GE/Honeywell transaction led the EU to pursue more
sophisticated economic analyses in its future merger investigations. Few in
the United States believe that the uncertain prospect of fostering changes
through such “feedback effects” that may (or may not) influence some areas
of the EU’s policy constitutes a satisfactory response to the loss of the
United States’ regulatory autonomy. Yet the alternative options are limited.
The somewhat surprising outcome is that the EU’s increasing
regulatory clout and its impact on U.S. businesses may lead the United
States to support greater oversight by international institutions. Though
often skeptical of international institutions’ ability to regulate the markets,
the United States may come to see international cooperation as an
opportunity to play a shared, rather than obsolete, role in the regulation of
global commerce. This might resemble the idea of “preemptive federalism,”
whereby the United States may seek international regulation as a means to
prevent the Brussels Effect. Having some influence over regulatory
standards is better than ceding influence to the EU altogether.259 But this, of
course, requires that the EU be prepared to forgo unilateralism for
multilateralism, enhancing the EU’s bargaining power in any such
negotiations.
At the same time, foreign states’ responses are complicated by the fact
that some foreign stakeholders welcome the EU’s extensive regulatory
activity. For instance, the intensity of U.S. corporations’ opposition to EU
rules likely depends on whether they are large, export-oriented producers or
small, non-export-oriented producers.260 If an export-oriented U.S. firm is
forced to adjust its global production to the (presumably more costly) EU
standard, the non-export-oriented U.S. firm gains a competitive advantage
in the firms’ home market (the only market in which the non-exporting firm
operates). The small non-exporting firm thus welcomes the de facto
Brussels Effect. However, these firms’ interests are reversed with respect to
a possible de jure Brussels Effect. An export-oriented U.S. firm often has
the incentive to advocate the EU standard in its home market after having
already adjusted to the EU standard. It benefits from leveling the playing
field in its home market at no additional cost to itself. In contrast, a nonexport-oriented U.S. firm is likely to resist the de jure Brussels Effect as it
258
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benefits from retaining its competitive advantage over the firm conforming
to the EU standard. Thus, the relative influence of export-oriented and nonexport-oriented firms will impact the United States’ response to the
Brussels Effect.
Some progressive states in the United States endorse the EU’s
leadership, voluntarily choosing to incorporate EU regulations into their
own state laws.261 Some developing country governments similarly
welcome the Brussels Effect. The Brussels Effect presents developing
countries with an opportunity to outsource their regulatory pursuits to a
more resourceful agency. Developing country antitrust agencies often free
ride on the EU’s antitrust investigations, benefiting from the global effects
of the EU’s decision to ban anticompetitive mergers or force firms to
amend their conduct and products globally. The countries with the desire,
but limited resources, to provide safer products for their consumers benefit
from the EU imposing strict standards that affect production patterns
globally. U.S. consumers who prefer higher levels of consumer protection
and a civil society that advocates environmental protection often seize on
EU policies and use them in their attempts to forge change in the United
States.262 These groups welcome the EU’s unilateralism, hailing the EU as
the benevolent provider of global public goods in situations where their
own countries or multilateral cooperation mechanisms fail to provide them.
Multinational U.S. corporations can also have a mixed reaction to EU
regulation. When trading across the common market, they benefit from
facing a single EU standard instead of twenty-seven different national
standards, even if that standard is higher than the average standard before
the upward harmonization took place in the EU. This way, EU regulations
can be seen as coordination devices that reduce complexity and enhance
predictability. U.S. corporations can also seize business opportunities in
third markets in situations where the EU bans certain products or
production methods domestically, but where there is still demand for those
products in third markets. In these markets where the Brussels Effect has
failed to take hold, U.S. producers are likely to face less competition from
EU producers.
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Finally, the EU provides a forum for U.S. producers to challenge their
competitors’ practices. REACH allows interested parties to submit
proposals to restrict the use of certain chemicals. This allows any producer
of chemicals, including a U.S. company, to seek denial of its competitors’
(including domestic competitors) substances in the EU.263 In the antitrust
realm, U.S. corporations have found the EU a valuable legal battleground
and frequently engage in forum shopping when they seek to halt practices
of their (often domestic) competitors. U.S.-based United Technologies was
the principal complainant in the GE/Honeywell merger investigation after
having lost its acquisition bid to GE. It was also a U.S. company that
brought charges against Microsoft in the EU,264 knowing that it was more
likely to obtain remedies in the EU, which harbors a broader notion of what
constitutes anticompetitive conduct. As the tables turned, Microsoft lodged
an antitrust complaint before the European Commission against Google.265
Whether these foreign stakeholders embrace or oppose the Brussels
Effect, they have the incentive to invest considerable resources in trying to
influence regulatory outcomes in the EU. Indeed, given the global reach of
the EU’s regulatory actions, lobbying activity is likely to be particularly
salient in Brussels as the benefits available from the possible regulatory
capture of the Commission or another EU institution is expected to exceed
the benefits of successfully influencing any other regulatory agency with
lesser global clout.
3. International Institutions.—At times, international institutions
have provided the most effective venue to challenge the EU regulations.
The WTO law prevents countries from restricting imports from countries
with less stringent regulations unless the importing country can provide a
scientific justification for the restriction or if the restriction is necessary to
protect public health or related to conservation of the environment.266 These
exceptions are subject to specific conditions to ensure that countries do not
use them as disguised forms of trade protectionism.267 Much of WTO
litigation therefore centers on the parties’ disagreement as to whether
263
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domestic regulations reflect a legitimate exercise of domestic regulatory
authority or whether they serve protectionist goals and hence constitute
impediments for international trade.
The United States did resort to the WTO in challenging the EU’s
prohibition on GMO food and hormone-treated beef, eventually winning its
core claims in both trade disputes.268 The United States claimed that the
EU’s alleged pursuit of food safety and concern for the health of its
consumers in reality reflected its desire to protect its farmers from foreign
competition.269 The EU defended its measures on grounds of genuine
consumer preferences, which in Europe reflect deep skepticism of GMOs
and growth-promoting hormones,270 and argued that scientific studies
supported its health concerns.271 The WTO ruled for the United States,
urging the EU to lift its import ban of hormone-treated beef and similarly
approve GMO products without “undue delay.” Most recently, the United
States has challenged the EU’s import ban of U.S. poultry that is rinsed in
chlorine—a process which, according to the United States, makes poultry
safe for consumption.272 These challenges suggest that the WTO should
indeed impose some limits on the EU’s regulatory pursuits.
Despite these victories, the WTO offers, at best, imperfect remedies.
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is characterized by weaknesses
such as nonretroactive damages.273 In addition, the WTO system cannot
compel a member state to lift its restrictive measures. It can merely
authorize sanctions against a noncompliant member state.274 For instance,
the EU has maintained its import ban on hormone-treated beef, preferring to
endure U.S. retaliation.275 The EU has also repeatedly allowed the deadline
for implementing the GMO ruling to lapse, while the United States has
268
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suspended its retaliatory measures in anticipation of settlement or the EU’s
future compliance.276 The difficulties the United States has faced in
obtaining the EU’s compliance suggests that the WTO provides even less
relief for the EU’s weaker trading partners. Authorizing a small developing
country to punish its powerful trading partner hardly guarantees that this
right will be used. Thus, retaliation rarely provides an effective remedy
outside of attempts by powerful countries, such as the partially successful
United States, to constrain the EU.
The WTO’s ability to constrain individual countries’ regulations is
further limited by its restricted mandate. The WTO bans discrimination
between importers and domestic producers.277 Yet many of the EU
regulations, while perhaps costly to foreign producers, are not
discriminatory in their nature: EU companies are subject to the same rules.
If the EU regulations have no disparate impact on foreign producers,
allegations of protectionism are difficult to maintain. The WTO can do little
to restrain such regulations that are costly yet not protectionist in their
object or effect. Further, many areas—such as antitrust and privacy—do not
fall within the purview of the WTO rules and its dispute settlement
mechanism in the first place.278 There have been several attempts to include
antitrust, among other new issue areas, under the WTO framework. All
those attempts have failed.279 And expanding the scope of the WTO to new
issue areas is even more unlikely today, as the consensus among over 150
countries that rarely agree on the content of the rules is increasingly beyond
reach.
Indeed, the WTO does not only fail to adequately constrain the
Brussels Effect; at times, it may even help to facilitate it. The WTO rules
limit the ability of the EU’s trading partners to respond to EU regulatory
pursuits with unilateral retaliation.280 Had the United States, for instance,
imposed trade sanctions on the EU when faced with the EU’s data transfer
ban, it would have violated the WTO rules and subjected itself to a WTO
complaint by the EU. In this sense, the WTO can also provide a shield for,
and not only a limitation to, the Brussels Effect.281
276
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B. Internal Constraints
The above discussion shows that the ability of other states or
international institutions to constrain the EU’s regulatory power is limited.
Instead, the greatest check on the EU’s regulatory power comes from within
the EU itself. The discussion on the precise conditions required for the
Brussels Effect to take place sets important limits on the EU’s
unilateralism. The growing diversity and discord within the EU will further
constrain the EU’s ability to promulgate new laws that could be
externalized—whether unilaterally or though political harmonization. Thus,
in as much as the emergence of the EU’s external regulatory agenda was a
product of its internal ambitions, the limits to its external influence are
similarly set by its internal agenda.
1.

The
Missing
Conditions
for
Unilateral
Regulatory
Globalization.—The preconditions for unilateral regulatory
globalization outlined above set important limits to the scope of the
Brussels Effect. Insufficient market power sets boundaries on the EU’s
global regulatory clout. For instance, the EU’s attempts to deny market
access to fish caught unsustainably has not triggered a Brussels Effect since
exporters have been able to sell their catch in other markets.282 The EU’s
limited market power with respect to GMOs was discussed above when
explaining why the Brussels Effect has been incomplete. The EU has been
even less effective in externalizing its regulations of automobiles to the
United States. For instance, the EU’s End-of-Life Vehicles Directive,283
which regulates recyclable components and toxic heavy metals contained in
automobiles, has had an insignificant impact on U.S. car manufacturers,
who sell virtually no cars in the EU. At the same time, this directive has
been successfully externalized on Korean and Japanese manufacturers.284 In
instances where adjustment costs are high and alternative markets exist,
producers are likely to forgo the EU market and divert trade elsewhere.
Further, EU powers derived from market access are limited to
imposing product standards for goods that are exported to the EU or, for the
same reason, to prohibiting anticompetitive conduct that has an effect on
the single market. These regulations can be contrasted with the EU’s failed
attempts to export its standards for management of hazardous waste. Strict
standards for waste disposal are costly for domestic producers. Illegal
transfers of hazardous waste remain common as producers have an
282
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incentive to evade regulations and find jurisdictions that do not enforce
waste management standards. Waste is movable and producers gain nothing
by trying to dump it in Europe. The EU has no leverage over this area
unless it can monitor these flows and ban products that involve
unsustainable waste management practices. Regulatory power is much
harder to project externally when it consists of attempts to unilaterally limit
exports to third countries versus preventing imports to one’s own market.285
In some areas, the EU’s market power is altogether irrelevant. First, the
EU has little leverage over targets of regulation that are not subject to
market access. Consider human rights, an area in which the EU has both
regulatory capacity and a strong preference to pursue high levels of
protection. But the EU has not been particularly successful in exporting its
human rights norms or democratic values outside of its direct sphere of
influence, such as countries in North Africa.286 This raises questions about
the view that the EU’s “normative power” has universal appeal, leading
countries to adopt the EU’s norms and standards voluntarily. In the end, the
EU derives its power from its ability to offer conditional access to its
markets. For example, signing a human rights treaty can be a condition for a
trade agreement with the EU.287 Enforcing it is another matter. It is much
easier to deny market access to a product that does not meet EU standards
or to ban a transaction that has an effect on the EU market than it is for the
EU to police international practices that involve individuals who never
enter the European market.
Second, the EU is sometimes constrained by its limited regulatory
capacity. The EU only has regulatory competence in any given area if the
member states have granted it such competence. However, this is a largely
theoretical limit since the EU has, over the years, acquired extensive
regulatory capacity in all areas relating to the single market. And these are
the very regulations that carry the attributes that lend themselves to
externalization. However, there are important policy areas where EU
member states have not transferred powers to the EU—including energy
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policy and corporate taxation—imposing limits on the EU’s external
influence in these matters.
The EU also fails to become the source of global standards in areas
where the regulatory propensity—the preference for high standards—is
absent. This can be true EU-wide, where all or most member states share a
preference for low regulation. Often the missing regulatory propensity,
however, reflects a preference for heterogeneity within the EU. Online
gambling is an example of an area where harmonization within the EU has
failed, with the U.K. favoring legalization of online gambling, while
countries like Germany and France have resisted legalization in an attempt
to protect their state monopolies on gambling.288 The EU is also divided on
questions like corporate tax harmonization with countries like Ireland (with
its 12.5% corporate tax rate) opposing any step towards tax harmonization
and countries like France (with its 34% corporate tax rate) endorsing
common rules.289 And when it comes to financial regulation of any kind, the
U.K.’s opposition is almost guaranteed.290
The EU’s regulatory clout is also limited in instances where other
states have a preference for higher standards. At times, the United States
prefers higher standards than the EU does. For instance, the U.S. standard
on automotive emissions remains more stringent than the European one
even today.291 Similarly, the United States’ Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
(Sarbanes–Oxley), targeted at improving corporate responsibility in the
post-Enron environment, is widely perceived as establishing the highest
global standard for corporate governance.292 Another manifestation of the
United States’ preference for strict financial regulation is the Dodd–Frank
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Act.293 Where the United States opts for strict standards, it can become the
source of global standards, assuming the conditions for unilateral regulatory
globalization are met. As the United States’ recent regulatory pursuits have
predominantly targeted the financial sector, it is less likely they will be
converted to global standards because of the relative elasticity of capital.
For instance, it has been debated whether the effect of Sarbanes–Oxley was
to ratchet up standards worldwide or to cause U.S. stock exchanges to lose
listings of foreign corporations.294 In any event, it is evident that the EU’s
ability to set the global rules alone is always contingent on it having a
preference for the highest rule, which may not always be the case.
In addition to the situation where the relatively permissive EU standard
yields to a stricter foreign standard, there may also be situations where one
country is stricter on one dimension of a regulation and another country
stricter on another dimension. In instances where the corporations are
unable to segment the markets, corporations may thus end up adhering to
even stricter standards than any single regulator would have required. This
situation would be an even more penetrating version of unilateral regulatory
globalization, where the global rule would be ratcheted up by a combination
of the strictest rules provided by different jurisdictions.
Further, the EU’s leverage is compromised in the case of regulation of
more elastic targets, such as capital. For instance, in the wake of the Euro
crises, the EU proposed a tax on financial transactions. This proposed tax
would cover a broad range of financial transactions between banks and
other financial institutions, including securities, bonds, currency
transactions, and derivatives.295 However, the EU knows that the
introduction of this tax would likely divert trading activity to financial
centers outside the EU. Unable to unilaterally impose this tax globally, the
293
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EU is pursuing political harmonization in the G-20.296 Yet, examples of
elastic targets can be found outside of capital markets as well. The
European Court of Justice’s recent denial of the patentability of human cells
is unlikely to lead to a global standard.297 The critics claim that the EU’s
stringency only drives stem cell research and business out of the EU,
highlighting the mobility of the industry.298
Also, when products do not call for a uniform standard, such as when
markets are divisible or scale economies are insufficient to justify a uniform
standard, the EU can at best achieve compliance with its standard, but not
globalization of those standards. This is true, for example, with respect to
labor laws that are not characterized by scale economies.299 Another
example comes from the antitrust domain. In 2007, the EU launched an
antitrust investigation into whether Microsoft’s practice of offering its
Windows software with only one Internet browser, the Microsoft-owned
Internet Explorer, presented antitrust concerns. In response, Microsoft
presented Windows 7 E, a Europe-only version of Windows that came with
no Internet browser.300 Several other products are also divisible across the
markets. Car manufacturers are responding to different national and
regional emission standards with diversified technologies in an effort to
minimize risks and maximize returns.301 DVDs offer another example. They
have different region codes allowing film distributors to segregate release
dates, content restrictions, and price across regions. Patent protection,
discussed above, is also divisible: the EU’s ability to impose its rules on the
patentability of human cells is constrained not only by the mobility of
research firms but also by the ability of these firms to continue filing
patents in other jurisdictions. Thus, the Brussels Effect is unlikely whenever
the firm’s costs of customizing its conduct or production to different rules
are low.
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With advances in technology, it is possible that goods will become
increasingly divisible in the future.302 It is likely to become technologically
feasible and economically viable to produce a greater range of product
varieties to serve the different consumer tastes and regulatory requirements
prevailing in different markets. The acknowledgment of the Brussels Effect
should further incentivize companies to develop technologies that allow for
greater divisibility at lower costs. Such a development, to the extent that it
applies to a significant number of product markets, may gradually erode the
EU’s ability to exert global regulatory clout in the future.
2. Internal Conflicts and the Growing Diversity.—Not everyone
within the EU benefits from its aggressive regulatory stance. EU
consumers, who value access to cheap imports, may occasionally question
whether the higher product standard justifies the higher cost products, in
particular in challenging economic times. Some EU corporations may also
find that excessively high regulatory standards are unsustainable for the
European economy. They argue that excessive reliance on the precautionary
principle may slow economic growth and innovation303 and price EU firms
out of critical export markets.304 Some companies in the EU might have
benefited from the unlevel playing field and lax regulations in markets
where the Brussels Effect has not taken hold. European companies have
increased their foreign direct investment (FDI) and established themselves
in third markets from which they import into the EU.305 As a result of
externalization of the EU standards, they can no longer reap gains from
lower production costs that drove them to those markets in the first place. In
addition, European companies whose competitiveness depends on their
access to cheaper foreign inputs are hurt when those inputs are subjected to
more burdensome regulations. Since approximately half of international
trade consists of trade in intermediate goods,306 it is difficult to identify
exactly who is winning and who is losing when one country is regulating
multinational corporations with worldwide supply chains. Thus, voices
within the EU may join those outside to call for reining in the excesses of
its regulatory accomplishments.
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As the EU’s regulatory powers grow, divisions within the EU also
grow. It becomes harder for the EU to pass new regulations amidst the
growing heterogeneity of its population. One salient example is that the EU
has been unable to create a common energy policy despite the EU member
states’ collective vulnerability to energy insecurity.307 Enlargement
magnifies this problem as preferences within the EU become more diverse
while the EU institutions fail to adjust to more complex decisionmaking.
There is also great disparity among the EU governments on what the
EU’s global role ought to be and how it should exercise its power. All other
powers have internal conflicts, yet the EU’s decisionmaking is always
subject to two potential veto points: support for any given policy must first
be garnered at the level of the member states, followed by the EU.308 At the
same time, the internal constraints have at times been a source of power for
the EU. Because of the visible internal divisions and resulting constraints in
its mandate, the EU has been able to obtain more concessions in
international trade negotiations than it would have had it been able to gain
approval for trade deals through majority voting.309 In pursuing negotiated
harmonization, this internal conflict can be a source of strength. But the
EU’s ability to unilaterally externalize its internal market hinges on its
ability to first agree on the internal rules capable of being exported.
Today, the EU faces a distinctive challenge to its authority. The
concurrent deepening and widening of the EU’s agenda has already created
severe constitutional crises within the EU, with the difficulties surrounding
the euro further testing the limits of solidarity within the union. The great
political divide in Europe today is not between the right and the left but
between those who are turned inwards and those who embrace globalization
and further integration. The former would scale back the powers transferred
to the EU in the name of reinstating the sovereignty of European nations.
Fearful of these demands, even the integrationists are growing more timid
in their calls for expanding EU powers at the expense of national
sovereignty. More European regulation means less sovereignty. And less
sovereignty means more unpredictability and loss of control akin to the
crises surrounding the common European currency. Thus, the growing gap
between these different visions within Europe for Europe in the end
presents perhaps the greatest challenge to the European external regulatory
agenda.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted the unprecedented global power that the
EU is exercising through its legal institutions and standards that it
successfully exports to the rest of the world via the Brussels Effect. Without
resorting to international institutions or seeking other nations’ cooperation,
the EU is able to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the
legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to the
“Europeanization” of important aspects of global commerce.
This discussion has been descriptive, intentionally omitting the
normative inquiry on whether the Brussels Effect is socially desirable. It
seems evident that corporations are not necessarily adjusting to EU
standards because of the prospect of mutual gains or some Paretoimproving outcome. If existing regulations in other jurisdictions are
optimal, the Brussels Effect is likely to lead to inefficiently high overall
global regulation, adversely affecting global welfare.310 But the Brussels
Effects may also lead to an efficient outcome. If existing regulations in
other jurisdictions are too permissive or weakly enforced, unilateral
regulatory globalization might be a desirable means of overriding
suboptimally low regulations elsewhere. The overall welfare effects of this
phenomenon are thus difficult to disentangle.311
The Brussels Effect may also raise concerns of democratic
accountability. The idea that unelected European civil servants have the
ability to block global transactions by U.S. companies can be disconcerting
to those involved. However, others might claim that the Brussels Effect
does not undermine U.S. democracy. The EU’s regulatory reach may have
the effect of balancing the overrepresentation of business interests in
American public life by empowering consumers.312 These are some of the
normative questions that this Article raises but intentionally leaves for
others.
The acknowledgement of the existence and influence of the Brussels
Effect has implications for how we think about power and the question of
who is powerful and why. If you were to ask national security experts
whether the EU is powerful, they would probably say no. If you were to ask
economists whether the EU is powerful, they would probably discuss how
the relative power of the EU is diminishing with the rise of China. But if
310
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you were to ask GE, Microsoft, Google, Monsanto, Dow Chemical, or
Revlon whether the EU is powerful, the answer would be a resounding (and
likely bitter) yes.
One key question is what type of power matters today. Much of
international relations discussion has until the recent past been preoccupied
by the traditional notion of military power. Yet the utility of military power
is declining.313 Economic concerns usually prevail over military
imperatives. The EU is making a conscious choice not to build a powerful
military—it rather free rides on the United States’ use of it. For instance,
the EU’s ability to influence central and eastern European countries was
significantly enhanced by the level of security and stability that existed
there, thanks to U.S. military power.314 Military free riding allowed the EU
to devote its resources to other activities instead, including promoting its
rules and standards in eastern European countries.
While the currency of international politics is increasingly economic
power, its possession is difficult to translate into concrete forms of
influence today. Economic power used to be associated with the United
States, the EU, and Japan. Today, economic power is more dispersed as
China and other emerging economies are growing in affluence. In the world
of multiple powers and heterogeneous interests, exercise of unilateral
economic power is rarely possible. The inability to conclude the WTO trade
talks is one reminder that in the world where many are powerful, nobody
alone is powerful enough to get anything done. Economic sanctions are
rarely successful today because embargoed nations have an easier time
finding alternative suppliers or markets for their products. Conditional aid
and other rewards, traditionally used by powerful nations and institutions
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as means of
leverage, are decreasingly effective as countries like China are prepared to
extend aid to rogue and needy countries—no strings attached.
When power is defined in terms of the actual influence that a country
can wield, the EU’s ability to penetrate vast areas of global commerce is
relevant. Contrary to traditional contours of influence, the Brussels Effect
captures a phenomenon where the EU does not have to do anything except
regulate its own market to exercise global regulatory power. The size and
attractiveness of its market does the rest. By virtue of being the world’s
largest trading block, the EU can dictate what is traded. It is one of the few
areas of influence where unilateralism still works. Regulatory power is a
less costly, more deployable, and more durable type of power. Also, unlike
other forms of power, it cannot easily be undermined by others.
Another advantage of regulatory power is its ability to generate
leverage that has the greatest impact with the lowest political profile. Many
313
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of the regulations appear technical but often have major implications on
countries, corporations, and consumers around the world. Conflicts over
regulatory power rarely elevate to the political level. Trade is a much less
controversial way of pursuing foreign policy objectives, in particular when
the EU can always, in principle, offer the choice of not complying with its
rules. Subscribing to EU rules is the price of trading with Europe. All the
EU is doing is exercising its right to protect its own consumers. This is a
less controversial position to take compared to a regime change pursued in
the name of laudable goals such as democracy or human rights. Thus, in
falling between coercion and cooperation, regulatory power strikes a
balance of legitimacy and potency that makes it a more efficacious option
than its alternatives.
The EU’s regulatory clout shows that the EU can be a superpower
without a super state. It is a shrewd and influential actor that projects its
values and makes the world to its liking by playing to its strengths. While
the EU portrays itself as a champion of multilateralism, it is selectively
supporting multilateralism in areas where it lacks unilateral power. The
more the EU bolsters the authority of the UN Security Council, the more
the EU can constrain the exercise of unilateral power by the United States.
But when it comes to the regulation of global markets, the EU can go it
alone and is hence less concerned about pursuing multilateral institutional
cooperation.
The discussion also challenges the primacy of the narrative that the EU
is a “normative power” that leads by example. The EU is often viewed as a
power that relies on persuasion to change “hearts and minds” and thereby
the preferences and identities of other actors. The EU is regularly portrayed
as a new type of power that steers away from coercion and relies instead on
positive incentives and soft power.315 This Article has not argued that those
propensities of influence are not within the EU’s repertoire of influence.
Yet, this Article has focused on what is a vast, unappreciated, and perhaps
the most controversial aspect of the EU’s global role: the EU’s unilateral
employment of tools of soft coercion that go against the preferences of its
trading partners.
An understanding of the existence and the full impact of the Brussels
Effect is likely to influence the perception of the EU by its trading partners.
But it is also likely to change the perception of the EU within the EU itself.
Acknowledgment of the EU’s global regulatory power might give pause to
both the EU’s relentless critics, who emphasize the EU’s weakness and
irrelevance, as well as to its most ardent defenders, who call for increasing
integration and a gradual move towards a federation that allows the EU to
rise to global prominence. For the critics, the discussion has shown that to
portray the EU as powerless focuses on a narrow and outdated vision of
315
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what power and influence mean. For the defenders, the discussion has
shown that the need to move towards a federation is probably not as
pressing given the extent to which the EU is already able to advance its
interests, within and beyond its borders.316 The EU is already a superpower
and, importantly, a superpower of a meaningful kind.
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